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A data-driven model of learning is proposed, where a network of nodes and links is constructed
that represents what has been heard and observed. Autism is viewed as the consequence of a dis-
order in the data-acquisition component of the model—essentially, it is the result of getting an
“inappropriate” distribution of data. The inappropriate data distribution leads to problems in data
segmentation, which, in turn leads to a poor network representation. It is shown how the model,
given inappropriate data distributions, can reproduce the main cognitive deﬁcits associated with
autism, including weak central coherence, impaired theory of mind, and executive dysfunction. In
addition, it is shown how the model itself can explain the inappropriate data distribution as the result
of an inappropriate initial network. Finally, we discuss the relationships between our model and
existing neurological models of autism, and the possible implications of our model for treatment.
Keywords: autism, data-driven model of learning, network, theory of mind, weak central coherence
∗Much of this work done while the author was on sabbatical at Cornell University. Cornell’s support is gratefully acknowl-
edged. Additional support was provided under grant 353/03 from the Israel Science Foundation.
†Supported in part by NSF under Grant IIS-0090145, a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a grant from
the NWO. Sabbatical support from CWI and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is also gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
Autism is a developmental disorder whose causes are unknown; it is currently deﬁned in terms of its
symptoms. These symptoms are grouped into three major categories: deﬁcits in reciprocal social in-
teraction, deﬁcits in verbal and nonverbal communication, and repetitive behaviors and interests [Eigsti
and Shapiro 2003; Volkmar and Pauls 2003]. Up until recently, there were three leading theories that
attempted to explain the core cognitive deﬁcits in autism, each focusing on a different cluster of symp-
toms:1
• Theory of mind, which refers to the ability to infer what others are thinking (believing, desiring)
in order to predict their behavior. This is an ability impaired in those suffering from autism
[Baron-Cohen 2000]. This cluster of deﬁcits includes difﬁculty with pretend play, problems in
understanding false beliefs, and the inability to detect lies.
• Weak central coherence, which refers to the tendency of individuals with autism to focus on local
details, rather than seeing the big picture [Frith 1989]. For example, autistic individuals seem to
have more difﬁculty than controls in recalling sentences or the gist of a story, while they are as
good as controls at recalling unconnected word strings [Hermelin and O’Connor 1967].
• Executive dysfunction, which refers to the inability of autistic individuals to be ﬂexible, while still
maintaining appropriate plans and inhibitions [Hill 2004; Pennington and Ozonoff 1996; Russell
1997]. This is often manifested in the form of behavior that perseveres inappropriately despite
changing goals [Ozonoff 1997].
While identifying these core deﬁcits certainly helps in the study of autism, it does not provide a
causal explanation of the disorder, nor does it provide a mechanism explaining how autism emerges. In
this paper, we propose a new conceptual model for autism in which the core deﬁcits, and other related
symptoms, emerge as a result of a much more basic disorder (which, of course, might itself have a
genetic cause or multiple genetic causes; cf. [Happ´ e et al. 2006]). We start by describing an (admittedly
naive) model for learning and cognitive development. We then show that, in this model, data-acquisition
problems (that may emerge from abnormal sensory input and problems with social orientation) lead to a
spectrum of problems similar to those observed in autism. Our model thus explains why primary deﬁcits
related to sensory input and social orientation may result in autism and its broader expressions, and why
intensive early intervention may sometimes help to remediate autism.
When we refer to data-acquisition problems here, we do not simply mean the somewhat obvious re-
lationship between a lack of data and poor learning. Rather, we argue that if fully-functional processing
mechanisms in the brain receive an atypical distribution of data, the result can be the type of abnormal
behavior characteristic of those suffering from autism. A simple analogy may help clarify our intuitions.
Imagine a robot that is programmed to bake cakes. It expects to ﬁnd the ingredients for the cake in three
containers. Thus, its program says things like “Take 2 cups from container 1, mix it with 1 cup from
container 2, wait 10 minutes, add half a cup from container 3, and put in the oven at 400◦ for one hour.”
Clearly, if the containers contain the wrong ingredients or insufﬁcient ingredients, then the ﬁnal product
will turn out qualitatively quite different from a “normal” cake, although (indeed, because!) the robot
1Somemorerecenttheories, suchastheextrememale-braintheory[Baron-Cohen2002], concept-formationfailure[Snyder
et al. 2004], and underconnectivity or temporal binding theories [Belmonte et al. 2004; Brock et al. 2002; Courchesne and
Pierce 2005] are considered later in the paper.
1correctly follows the prescribed algorithm. The main problem here is not only that a smaller quantity
of ingredients results in a poor cake, but that a mismatch between prescribed quantities and processing
time inevitably yields a “different” cake. Many different outputs (cakes) are possible, depending on the
ingredients in the containers and their quantity.
In our model, the ingredients in the containers are the data, which include scenes and (sequences
of) words, and the robot is the brain’s processing algorithm, which has evolved to handle a natural ﬂow
of data (at a rate and with a distribution like that faced by an average child). As in our analogy, when
the wrong quantities of data are processed by the prescribed algorithms, there is a range of possible
abnormal outcomes, depending on the quantity and distribution of data received. The label “autism”
actually covers a rather wide spectrum of behaviors. Different types of autism may result from different
abnormal distributions of data and rates of data ﬂow. The model suggests that, if we are looking for
genetic and biological causes for autism, then we should look at mechanisms that affect data acquisition,
or, more precisely, to mechanisms that direct which data is acquired more often and which data should
be ignored.
Although our approach has points of connection with a number of other approaches that have ap-
peared in the literature (we discuss the connections in later sections), there seems to be very little work
in the literature trying to ﬁnd a causal model of the type we are looking for, based on problems with
underlying mechanisms for data acquisition (although the idea that autism is caused by problems with
underlying mechanisms, modeled as computer programs, does appear in very preliminary form in an
early paper by Kahn and Arbib [1973]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our basic framework. In
particular, we describe how we assume that a child represents data, using a network consisting of nodes
labeled by data and links between them. We describe the key features of the network, how an inappro-
priate distribution of data could cause differences between the networks of normal children and autistic
children, and how these differences could lead to autism. Finally, we discuss evidence in support of the
basic model and sketch an explanation within the model itself of how an inappropriate data distribution
might arise. In Section 3 we show in more detail how the “autistic” networks of Section 2 can produce
many of the classic symptoms associated with impaired theory of mind, weak central coherence, and
problems with executive function. In Section 4 we present a computer simulation that illustrates some
of the principles of our model and provides additional insight into the model. We conclude in Section 5
with some discussion of the model’s predictions and its general implications for the behavioral treat-
ments of autism. We believe that the model has implications far beyond autism; we discuss some of
them in Section 5.
2 The Basic Framework
A child is exposed to a large variety of sensory data: visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile. There is
too much data for anyone to absorb; somehow a child must decide what to focus on, or treat as relevant,
while ignoring the rest. Then the child must somehow represent the data that is viewed as relevant.
Although the focus in this paper is autism, we believe that to get a good understanding of autism, it
is important to understand how children decide what is relevant and how they represent data. While
getting a deep understanding of how this is done may take decades, we already have enough of an
understanding at this point to be able to sketch a workable model. In sketching the model, we try to
be clear on what we take to be the status of various assumptions we make. We start by considering the
2issue of representation, and consider later (see Section 2.3) how the data might be “ﬁltered” so that a
child focuses on what he or she thinks is most relevant.
We assume that, after ﬁltering, the incoming data stream consists of relatively short, discrete units.
In the case of auditory data, these units could consists of phrases in some language, snippets of songs,
the barking of a dog, and so on. In the case of visual data, the input could consist of sequences of visual
“scenes”.2 It is not yet clear how the sensory inputs provided by a scene or utterance and the associations
between them are represented by neural structures or activities in the brain. But they clearly must be
represented somehow. We use a standard tool of discrete mathematics, and describe the representation
by a network; that is, a collection of nodes and links. The nodes are labeled by the inputs and the links
describe the associations between them.3 We further assume that each node and link has associated with
it a weight (which we take to be a real number between 0 and 1) that, intuitively, describes a combination
of how frequently the data item labeling the node has been seen and the importance of the context in
which it has been seen. Again, it is clear that there must be an analogue to weight. Any data that is
learned will eventually be forgotten in the absence of further reinforcement. We can think of the weight
as a measure of how long it will take to be forgotten. The weight is also correlated with the likelihood of
retrieval. Our assumption that the weight of nodes increases with the number of observations of the data
labeling the node and with the importance of the context in which the observation was made is consistet
with recent views of memory mechanisms as being adaptive [Nairne et al. 2007].
A portion of a child’s network is described in Figure 1. This network has a node labeled with the
auditory input “Jon”, with an associated weight of .8, and another node labeled with the auditory input
“drinks milk”, with a weight of .4. The node labeled “Jon” is joined by a link with a weight of .7 to a













Figure 1: A portion of a child’s network.
2We are implicitly thinking of “continuous” visual data as having been discretized, like a movie, which consists of a
sequence of static scenes. This does not mean that the brain cannot handle continuous data, only that it must ultimately
represent it using (small) discrete units.
3The use of such an abstract representation for inputs and associations resembles the use of concepts such as genes and
alleles in population genetics, long before the discovery of DNA. A “gene” was initially an abstract term describing the
presumed representation of a trait in the genome, where a trait was operationally deﬁned (as color, size, shape, behavioral
strategy, and so on).
3Determining exactly what physical constructs in the brain correspond to the nodes and links in our
network representation is beyond the scope of this paper. But discussions of this issue arise frequently
in the literature. For example, temporal binding theory [Brock et al. 2002; Milner 1974] suggests that
nouns and objects may be encoded by speciﬁc neuronal units, while their unique combinations in time
and space may be coded by synchronous neural activity. If this theory is true, then, at least for inputs
corresponding to words, the nodes in our model can be taken to be neuronal units and the links to be the
synchronous activation of them. Similarly, if the neuronal clique theory [Lin et al. 2006] of encoding
memory is correct, the neural cliques (network level coding units) are the nodes, while the links are the
neuronal structures or temporal activities that assemble these cliques into hierarchies.
We are not the ﬁrst to suggest using networks to represent data. Indeed, some features of our
model resemble those of other approaches that involve data representation by networks; however, the
details are quite different. Moreover, some critical elements in our model have no analogues in current
frameworks in the literature. Thus, rather than using a particular pre-existing modeling approach such
as artiﬁcial neural networks or cortical feature maps (see, for example, [Gustafsson 1997]), we use what
is in some sense the simplest model needed to illustrate the basic principles of our approach. We discuss
the relationship between our framework and others later in the paper.
2.1 Constructing the Network
To be useful, a representation must be well organized. We expect the network to be used for searching,
goal-directed behavior, and problem solving (in ways that we make clear below). The link structure of
a well-constructed network must make it easy to do all these things. As we shall see, the crux of our
theory is that the network of autistic children is poorly constructed, with particular systemic problems
that cause the symptoms of autism.
There are a number of obvious types of associations that we expect a well-constructed network
to represent, including temporal co-occurrence of data items, spatial co-occurrence of data items, and
similarity of data items. Keeping track of the fact that caterpillars often crawl on leaves is clearly im-
portant to a bird; for similar reasons spatial and temporal co-occurrence is relevant to hunters. Temporal
co-occurrence is also critical for causality, while similarity is critical for generalization.
The network in Figure 1 illustrates these associations. A normal child who has heard a phrases like
“Jon drinks milk”, “Jon”, and “milk” at various times might end up with such a network. The link
between the nodes labeled “Jon” and “drinks milk” represents the fact that these phrases were heard at
almost the same time.4 The other links can be similarly explained.
There is a simple technique that ensures that the network will be constructed this way. Roughly
speaking, we assume that the ﬁrst time a child hears a phrase such as “Jon drinks milk”, a node labeled
“Jon drinks milk” is added to the network. When later the phrase “Dan drinks milk is heard”, we assume
that the child recognizes that both phrases share the common subphrase “drinks milk”. The label “Jon
drinks milk” is then segmented to “Jon” and “drinks milk”, with a link (representing temporal co-
occurrence) joining the nodes with these labels. A node labeled “Dan” is also added, with a link to the
node labeled “drinks milk”.
4A slightly more sophisticated representation might use a directed network, where the links have arrows. In this case, the
link might be directed from “Jon” to “drinks milk”, to represent the fact that “Jon” was heard just before “drinks milk”. We
do not need to assume this level of sophistication for our results, although the brain might well keep track of this.
4Hearing the same phrase repeatedly increases its weight. The fact that the node labeled “Jon” has
a weight of .8, while “drinks milk” has a weight of only .4 indicates that “Jon” has been heard more
frequently (or in more signiﬁcant circumstances—see below) than “drinks milk”. We assume that the
weights labeling nodes and the links that connect them decay over time unless they are refreshed by
further examples/observations. We further assume that there is a threshold weight; once the weight of
a node or link reaches this threshold, that node/link is ﬁxed in memory, and, in the case of the node, its
label is not further segmented.5
Decay and ﬁxation are critical to our framework. Decay allows mistakes to be eliminated (we do
not want children to remember random co-occurrences), while ﬁxation preserves reliable data units
and the links between them. They are clearly both adaptive, and are closely linked to forgetting and
remembering. Moreover, there is a great deal of empirical support for them. Work on memory shows
that some data seems to be ﬁxed in memory, and is remembered over long stretches of time [Tulving and
Craik 2000]. The fact that we do not forget an old telephone number suggests that the node representing
that number is ﬁxated. Similarly, the fact that the smell of a particular perfume may trigger a memory of
a romantic evening suggests that the link between node representing the smell and the node representing
the romantic evening is ﬁxated (as are the nodes). On the other hand, memories do fade over time,
showing that there must be physical construct that corresponds to weights decaying. It is clear that we
need something like a threshold to avoid over-segmentation. For example, we do not want to segment
“carpenter” into “car” and “penter”.6
The idea that there is a critical window for segmentation, between when the weight of a node hits
the ﬁxation threshold and when it decays to 0, is perhaps the main novel idea in our representation. We
can think of this as the “sensitive period” during which learning can occur. Because the segmentation
of sequences takes place between decay and ﬁxation, an inappropriate data distribution can result in
poor segmentation of data sequences, which in turn can result in a network with an “inefﬁcient” link
structure, whose nodes are labeled by long data sequences. In particular, if one data sequence s is
observed repeatedly, and data sequences that share some common subsequence with s are observed
only rarely, then s may reach ﬁxation before being segmented, and thus be represented by a single
node. For example, if an autistic child hears “Don’t touch the stove” repeatedly, while not hearing other
phrases that involve “don’t”, “touch”, or “stove”, then “Don’t touch the stove” may become ﬁxated. A
consequence of this is that, rather than using the word “stove” appropriately, the whole phrase will be
uttered. We stress that the fact that the child does not hear “don’t”, “touch”, or “stove” in other phrases
does not necessarily mean that such phrases are never uttered in the child’s presence. Rather, it means
that, due to the child’s ﬁlter, the child does not pay attention to these phrases. Thus, when we talk
about “inappropriate data distribution” here, we simply mean the data distribution after the child has
ﬁltered out data he views as irrelevant is different from what the algorithms typically get; this includes
insufﬁcient data and data with an atypical distribution.
Our examples have considered segmentation of words. Similar examples involving segmentation
5Although, for convenience, we are viewing the threshold as sharp, it is perhaps more realistic to think that the higher the
weight, the less like it is that the weight decays. This change has no signiﬁcant impact on our approach.
6Segmentation is further complicated if there are a number of alternative ways in which data sequences can be segmented
based on commonalities (a problem that increases when more data is available). The decision regarding how to segment in
this case may be based on the relative weight of the alternatives (an example is given in Section 4) or, more generally, by
ﬁnding the most appropriate segmentation for the context (as emphasized by Solan et al. [2003]). For example, the sequence
“carpenter” may not be segmented to “car” and “penter” because it is accompanied by an image of a carpenter rather then by
an image of a car. We discuss the problem of ﬁnding context in more detail in Section 3.
5of images result in links that represent spatial co-occurrence. Besides links representing temporal and
spatial co-occurrence, we believe that a well-constructed network should also have links that represent
similarity. The weights on a link that represents temporal or spatial co-occurrence can be thought of as
capturing the frequency and/or importance of the co-occurrence. (For example, even if the association
of hissing with a snake does not occur frequently, the link might well have high weight because of the
importance of this co-occurrence for survival [Nairne et al. 2007].) By way of contrast, the weight on
a link that represents similarity captures the degree of similarity. (We are implicitly assuming that links
are “tagged” with type, so that a link representing temporal co-occurrence can be distinguished from a
link representing similarity.)
We do not consider here the details of how similarity is recognized. We assume that there is a
process that can compare two data items for similarity, including similarity of subcomponents. While
this is certainly a signiﬁcant assumption, it is consistent with recent studies (see [Sloutsky 2003] and the
references therein). Moreover, however it is done, we would argue that such a process must exist, since
it is essential to identify different representations of the same data item. For example, a child may have
seen the dog Fido in a number of contexts, and from a number of viewpoints (in the house, on the ﬁeld,
from the front, and from the rear), and have separate nodes for each of these instances of Fido. At some
point, the child may realize that the dog labeled Fido seen from the front is the same as the dog labeled
Fido seen from the rear, and coalesce the nodes labeled by these two images. Such coalescing plays a
signiﬁcant role in learning. It means that what the child has learned about Fido in different contexts can
be combined.
Recognizing similarity is also critical for doing generalization. For example, suppose that a network
includes a number of nodes representing people, such as “Jon”, “Dan”, “Shania”, and “Louisa”. These
nodes are not similar enough to be coalesced, since they are associated with somewhat different visual
images. On the other hand, they are similar in that they all have links to nodes like “rides a bicycle”
(or just “rides” and “bicycle”, if “rides a bicycle” has been segmented), “drinks milk”, and many others.
By observing the commonality, generalization is possible—these nodes can be grouped into a concept
such as “child”. Formally, what this means is that a new node labeled “child” is created, with links
from the nodes labeled “Jon”, “Dan”, and so on to the node labeled “child”. These links can be viewed
as “is-a” links. Jon is a boy, boys are children, children are people, people are living things, and so
on.7 The subnetwork of a network consisting of the nodes constructed by the generalization process can
be viewed as what is called an is-a hierarchy. The importance of is-a hierarchies has been frequently
noted in the AI (Artiﬁcial Intelligence), psychology, and neural network literature [Brachman 1985;
Fahlman 1979; McClelland and Rogers 2003]. We argue later that generalization is also critical for
having what has been called “mentalizing abilities” in the literature [Baron-Cohen 2000], that is, the
ability to attribute mental states to others.
For a network to be used effectively, we must assume that there are other processes that can effec-
tively search and explore the network. For example, suppose that a child wants milk. We assume that
the child then searches its network for a node associated with the feeling of drinking milk. Suppose
that the child ﬁnds a node linked to the feeling of drinking milk. Such a node is linked to an image of
milk and a phrase such as “want milk” (or to “want” and “milk”, which are themselves linked). Once
a relevant node is located, the links can be used to go from the desire for milk to a request for milk. In
7Although we are assuming different types of links—links that represent temporal and spatial co-occurrence, links that
represent similarity, and links that represent generalization—it seems plausible to us that the weights on all these links might
have the same physical realization, in terms of the degree of activation. However, as we have said before, our framework is
independent of the exact realization of the network.
6general, we assume that the exploration is done in a way that takes advantage of the weights, so that
links with higher weight are explored before links with lower weight. Exploring a node or link in the
process of the search may also have the effect of increasing its weight. Thus, after a number of searches
for a particular item, the search itself will go faster.
In our discussion, we have assumed a number of processes, in particular, processes that segment
data, recognize similarity, search a network, and so on. We have been deliberately vague here on how
these processes work. While there is a reasonable consensus that these processes exist, there is far from
a complete understanding of how they actually work; this is an area of active research. For example,
there has been a great deal of work on how infants do word segmentation (see [Brent 1999; Jusczyk
1999] and the references therein), and a number of different models have been proposed. In addition,
there has been a great deal of work on generalization in the context of neural nets (see [McClelland and
Rogers 2003] and the references therein) and on searching in networks (see [Kleinberg 2001] and the
references therein). Both bodies of work emphasize the importance of having links that reﬂect local
structure and that model hierarchical structure (i.e., is-a hierarchies). Not only is there active work in
this area, the work has led to theories that do not always agree. (For example, there are quite different
theories on how word segmentation is done [Brent 1999].) Fortunately, for building a general theory of
the type we are trying to build, the details of how these processes work do not matter. All that matters
is that they exist.8
2.2 The Data-Acquisition Disorder and the Evidence For It
Theclaimthatdifferentdatadistributionsarelikelytoresultindifferentrepresentationsishardlysurpris-
ing or controversial. But this is not enough to explain autism. Not all “nonstandard” data distributions
result in autistic behavior. Clearly, deaf or blind children get data distributions that differ from those of
normal children, and do not typically develop autism. What is important for our claims is that the data
distributions encountered by autistic children (that is, the distribution of the data after ﬁltering the vast
amount of data that the child is exposed to) have the following two properties.
• There is relatively little data about people and their behaviors (including social interactions).9
• Some phrases (or non-verbal data sequences) are encountered repeatedly in “signiﬁcant” contexts
(one which are given high weight), and their constituents are encountered rarely in other contexts.
For example, a phrase such as “Don’t touch the stove” may be encountered relatively frequently,
while “don’t”, “touch”, and “stove” may be encountered rarely in contexts other than “Don’t
touch the stove!”.
Note that the ﬁrst property leads to networks with relatively few nodes related to people and their
interactions; moreover, the nodes involving people and their interactions that are in the network are
likely to have relatively low weight. The second property leads to networks whose nodes are labeled
by relatively long data sequences, with inefﬁcient link structure. To understand why, note that because
we assume that segmentation is due to similarity between parts of data sequences, if a long phrase like
8We remark that in our computer simulation in Section 4 we do make further assumptions about the segmentation process
for deﬁniteness but, as we point out there, other segmentation processes should give qualitatively similar results.
9There may well be other domains for which an autistic child may have relatively little data, but all that matters for our
analysis is that they have relatively little data about people.
7“Don’t touch the stove!” is heard repeatedly without hearing “touch” and “stove” in other contexts,
“Don’t touch the stove!” will eventually approach ﬁxation and be stored as one data unit, without being
segmented.10 Similarly, repeated attention to a particular dog image in a favorite children’s book may
result in storing this image as one data unit before the observation of the features of dogs in other images
allows for the segmentation of the image into some shared shared visual components (eyes, ears, tail,
and so on).
Having a network whose nodes are labeled with many long phrases, rather than a network whose
nodes are labeled with short (typically single-word) phrases linked together is the effect of the second
property. (Similar comments hold for images as well as phrases, of course.) Note that we would not
expect the data distribution of blind or deaf children to have these two properties, even though they
are likely to be quite different from those of normal children. What is important is not just that data
distributions differ, but how they differ.
How reasonable is it to expect autistic children to suffer from such a data-acquisition disorder? To
examine this issue, we ﬁrst consider the evidence for such data-acquisition disorders more generally.
Extensive research has been conducted on the mechanism of ﬁlial and sexual imprinting in animal
behavior [Bateson 1966; Bateson 1979; Hauber et al. 2001; ten Cate and Vos 1999]. These studies have
shown that, in many young animals, during sensitive developmental periods, a set of innate preferences
for particular stimuli (such as particular fragments of a bird song) help guide the search for the most
suitable model of a parent, a future potential mate, or a tutor for song learning [Bateson 1979; Hauber
et al. 2001; Soha and Marler 2000]. These innate preferences are reﬁned by experience through the
imprinting process, ensuring that further social attachment and learning will develop appropriately. In
other words, future learning is based on acquiring relevant data by following, imitating, and learning
from the correct models. Although no natural data-acquisition disorder has been reported in this respect
(whichisnotsurprising, consideringthatsuchadisordermakessurvivalquiteunlikely), asimpleversion
of such a disorder can easily be induced in captivity. By merely replacing the correct model with an
inappropriate model, the young of many birds and mammals can be imprinted on other species, on their
human caregivers, or even on their empty cage [Bateson 1966; Bateson 1979]. Such animals are usually
incapable of acquiring typical social behavior and are unlikely to survive in the wild. The potential risk
of misimprinting is considered on a regular basis when raising young animals to be released in the wild,
and has been implicated in shaping the evolution of animal behavior [Lotem 1993; Rodriguez-Girones
and Lotem 1999]. The reason, we believe, is that misimprinting leads to interpreting the “wrong” data as
relevant, and thus results in a highly skewed distribution of data relative to a normally-imprinted animal.
Autism in humans is clearly a much more complex disorder than that resulting from artiﬁcially-
induced social misimprinting in animals. Yet humans also seem to have a set of innate preferences
that direct their social orientation and early cognitive development. It is not important for our purposes
whether these preferences are completely innate or are extended by pre- and post-natal experience. It is
clear, however, that human babies not only seek a warm human touch, but also express a great interest
in human voices and faces, and even the direction of adults’ eye gaze [Haith et al. 1977; DeCasper and
Fifer 1980; Emery 2000].
All these initial preferences have been found to be impaired in autistic children (at least to some
degree). Autistic children typically display a marked lack of interest in other people relative to other
10Even if it is segmented into ”Don’t touch”, ”the” and ”stove!”, there will be links with high weights between these three
segments. This will result in them being treated as a “tight cluster”, from which it is hard to make connections. (We return to
this issue at the beginning of Section 3.)
8children [Baron-Cohen and Bolton 1993; Howlin 1998]. More speciﬁcally, they are less likely to follow
eye gaze [Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Klin et al. 2003], to be interested in human faces [Hobson et al.
1988; Pierce et al. 2001], or to attend to human voices [Klin 91]. It has been suggested that this, in turn,
leads to problems in joint attention and imitation [Carpenter and Tomasello 2000; Frith 1989; Heyes
2001; Mundy 1995]. In addition, many autistic children apparently derive little positive feedback or
enjoyment from watching, touching, being with, and being touched or hugged by other people [Frith
1989; Howlin 1998]. All these impairments provide evidence for the ﬁrst property that we assumed,
namely, that autistic children acquire relatively less data about people. Autism researchers are certainly
aware of these problems in social orientation. Some have even proposed that deﬁcits in social orientation
and joint attention might be the primary cause for autism [Carpenter and Tomasello 2000; Heyes 2001;
Insel et al. 1999; Mundy 1995]. However, to date, there has been no explanation of how these basic
deﬁcits can cause the more complex deﬁcits and cognitive abnormalities observed in autistic children.
As we mentioned earlier, data-acquisition problems in autism are not related only to social data.
Occasionally, autistic children either display extremes of sensitivity to stimuli such as touches, sounds,
or smells (being either very sensitive to them or displaying very little sensitivity to them), although
there is no evidence that the problem is in the sensory mechanism itself. This has commonly been
viewed in the literature as a sensory-processing problem that has to do with the way the brain responds
to input [Anzalone and Williamson 2000; Frith 1989]. Some of these problems have been viewed
as problems that emerge from enhanced perceptual functioning [Mottron et al. 2006]. The causal
relationship between sensory or perceptual abnormalities and impaired social interest in autism is not
yet clear. It is possible that the latter is caused by the former, or that both are caused by a more basic
neurological problems. Whatever the cause, the result is an atypical data distribution.
Finally, children along the autistic spectrum have a tendency to exhibit interest in peculiar and un-
usual subjects (such as a strong interest in vacuum cleaners), and to insist on acquiring and memorizing
detailed data about these subjects [Baron-Cohen and Bolton 1993; Frith 1989; Tager-Flusberg et al.
2001]. Again, this results in an atypical distribution of data.
These problems in data acquisition have a number of effects. The lack of interest in other people
results in observing and hearing less relevant data per unit of time, since much of our auditory input
comes from listening to other people. Recall that one effect of this in our model is that nodes and links
are more likely to decay before becoming ﬁxated, which will result in fewer opportunities for successful
learning. The lack of joint attention may also result in auditory input being associated incorrectly with
visual input [Carpenter and Tomasello 2000]. A higher-level problem is that an autistic child may
not care if listeners are following his own eye gaze or center of attention. This further reduces the
probability of obtaining any answers, or correct answers, which in turns reduces the number of correct
links. Moreover, it reduces the motivation to communicate, thus resulting in even less data. The lack
of interest in people can also result in certain (intuitively inappropriate) parts of a scene or a sentence
being viewed as “interesting”, while other parts are ignored. For example the scene “Jon drinks milk”
may be taken as a scene of “drinking milk”, with Jon being ignored, or a movement of a man’s ﬁngers
may cause an autistic child to be interested in the hands but not in the person [Baron-Cohen and Bolton
1993]. This will result in inappropriate scenes being linked to certain utterances.
Despite their general reduced interest in people, autistic children may still be interested in close
or familiar people or in things that occur under particularly rewarding contexts (such as contexts that
provide food or a high level of excitement). But this too may result in a skewed distribution that leads to
inappropriate ﬁxation. For example, a lack of general interest in human speech, combined with a strong
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in the context “Don’t touch the baby”, when the phrase is related to something that he wants to and is
about to do. As a result, the phrase “Don’t touch the baby” will get ﬁxated, rather than being segmented
as a result of hearing “baby” and “touch” in other contexts. It is commonly observed in autistic children
that they use long phrases like “don’t touch the baby” when they see a baby. Often these phrases are
lines in songs about animals or objects, or phrases taken from television shows or children’s books. This
phenomenon, where a child “echoes” a phrase such as “Do you want milk?” when she asks for milk,
is known as echolalia or echolalic speech, and is typical among autistic children [Frith 1989; Howlin
1998]. In fact, to a large extent our model was inspired by the phenomenon of echolalic speech, which
intuitively seems like a problem of data segmentation. Interestingly, the literature on word segmentation
makes no references to echolalic speech in autism or to any similar disorder of word segmentation.
Moreover, in a review of research on word segmentation, Brent [1999] comments that very little reliable
and reproducible data about children’s segmentation errors is available. It seems that researchers on
word segmentation have not noted the possible connection between autism and segmentation problems,
which is a central theme in our framework.
It is much more difﬁcult to obtain similar evidence for segmentation problems in nonverbal data.
But given the evidence for such problems in speech data, we make the leap of assuming that similar
problems occur in other contexts. As we show in Section 3, making such a leap, together with all the
other assumptions we have made, leads to a model with a great deal of explanatory power.
2.3 Where Does the Inappropriate Data Distribution Come From?
Why might an autistic child have an inappropriate data distribution? As we suggested in Section 2.2,
this certainly might be an outcome of well-known problems of autistic children with social orientation
and joint attention. But is there a deeper causal explanation of these problems in data acquisition?
There is a great deal of data available to a child. Most of it is ignored, to prevent sensory overload.
How does a child decide what to pay attention to? This is a critical issue since it effectively determines
the child’s distribution of data. (Recall that when we talk about a child’s data distribution, we are
referring not to the distribution of data available to the child, but the distribution of the data that the
child actually pays attention to.) We now propose a mechanism where the network itself can act as
a ﬁlter that determines what the child pays attention to. While this mechanism is not critical to our
argument that autism is a result of problems in the distribution of data, we view the fact that we can use
the network itself to determine relevance, rather than needing to assume some external mechanism that
somehow “knows” what is relevant, as a signiﬁcant advantage of our approach.
The idea is that an individual will pay attention to a data sequence to the extent that it matches items
already in the network. The better the match, the more attention will be paid to the item. This view is
consistent with our view of the network as a way of organizing the individual’s view of the world. Not
only does the network keep track of associations, it keeps track of degree of importance. It is clearly
adaptive for an individual to pay attention to important items. For example, we would expect that, for
an animal, the image of a hiding place, the sense of distasteful food item, or the sound of a predator’s
footfall are all important. These are items that should have high weights in a “good” network for the
animal.
But the network structure allows us to go beyond just looking for matches to nodes with high weight.
For one thing, parts of a data sequence that is viewed as “interesting” that do not match pre-existing
10nodes themselves become labels of new nodes, and can be used to “attract” more new data from the
environment. Thus, we get associative learning. For example, when networks are built this way, a bird
can learn to focus on a certain type of leaf after seeing a tasty caterpillar on such a leaf a few times.
A second advantage of thinking in terms of the network structure is that the network can be used
to deal with conﬂicting matches. There may be a great deal of data that matches to some degree with
nodes in the network. We expect individuals to focus on those data sequences that match nodes with
higher weight. Again, this is adaptive: we should focus more on more important data rather than on less
important data. We observe this phenomenon all the time. A child already very interested in cars will
naturally focus on cars. For similar reasons, we would also expect an autistic child interested in vacuum
cleaners to focus on them. Of course, the effect of focusing on data sequences that already have high
weight in the network will be to increase their weight. It also has the effect of bringing into the network
data items related to data items in the network.
The assumption that individuals represent their information using a network suggests that there must
be some initial network-like structure. In biological terms, it can perhaps be thought of as a genetically
preconﬁgured neural structure that represents some data items and the links between them, to which
external input can be compared. The positive feedback cycle means that quite small differences in
the initial network can lead to quite different networks in older children. The existence of such an
innate initial network is very much in keeping with the presumed “innate templates” observed in animal
behavior [Bateson 1966; Bateson 1979]. As we noted earlier, several studies suggest that both animals
and humans have a set of innate preferences that guide their search for the most suitable model of a
parent, a social mate, or a tutor for learning and imitation. It is also known that animals have innate
responses to some key stimuli related to recognizing food, predators, and social partners [Shettleworth
1998].
We can think of the initial network as a “starter”, around which the network develops. The nodes
of this network will essentially act as “attractors” for matching data from the environment, and will
focus the attention of the individual on certain data items and not others. By analogy, the network
grows around the initial nodes like a crystal that crystallizes around initial starters. Having inappro-
priate starters can result in attention being focused inappropriately, which in turn results in getting an
inappropriate data distribution. Under this viewpoint, the data-acquisition problems of autistic children
can be traced to an inappropriate initial network or some “damage” to the network during the ﬁrst years




Figure 2: The causal structure of the framework.
11Of course, to the extent that this is correct, differences in the initial network clearly would have an
impact well beyond autism. For example, they can help explain sex differences of the kind studied by
Baron-Cohen et al. [2002]. It seems possible that small genetic differences between males and females
can result in differences in their initial network. For example, suppose that females’ initial networks typ-
ically have them focus more than males on data about things like human facial expressions, eye gaze,
body language, voice tunes, and other features that are related to people’s social behavior and emotional
states, while males’ initial networks result in males focusing more on data about people’s physical at-
tributes, such as how they run, jump, hunt and ﬁght, and about their physical environment (e.g., features
of their landscape or objects in the environment that can be used and manipulated). These initial differ-
ences, when ampliﬁed by the positive feedback loop, can result in females having networks that have
much more data about other people, and so (as discussed in Section 3.1) being better at mentalizing and
empathizing with others, while males have networks that lead to their being better at manipulating the
environment and what Baron-Cohen et al. [2003] call “systemizing”, that is, constructing explanatory
theories of how the world works, and constructing and controlling systems.
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues [2002, 2003] have used this empathizing-systemizing dichotomy
as a way of explaining autism. Our model is consistent with the view that high-functioning autism and
Asperger syndrome are like an extreme male condition in terms of failure to acquire human data and
developing an empathizing network. One possible explanation of this similarity in terms of our model is
in terms of similarities in the initial network of an autistic child and a child with extreme male condition.
However, it might also depend in part on the fact that it may require more data to learn how to attribute
mental states to others (see the discussion in Section 3.1 below). Systemizing of simple systems can
be done with relatively little data, so that even a severely autistic child is likely to systemize something
(e.g., he can probably ﬁnd patterns in his collection of toys). Thus, even if there is no problem in the
initial network of an autistic child, he may end up exhibiting symptoms of an extreme male condition
due to an inappropriate data distribution.
We remark that this view of the empathizing-systemizing spectrum as arising from differences in
an initial network is compatible with Badcock and Crespi’s [2006] genetic imprinting theory of autism.
Roughly speaking, Badcock and Crespi view autism as the outcome of a “conﬂict” between genes
coming from the father and mother’s side. To the extent that the father’s genes are expressed, we get
more systemizing; to the extent that the mother’s genes are expressed, we get empathizing. In our
framework, the expression of the genes is reﬂected in the initial network.
2.4 Summary and Related Work
We have discussed how a child constructs a network, with weights on nodes and links. Clearly, the more
(accurate) data a child has, the more useful the network constructed is like to be. For example, in a
“good” network, a word is linked to a visual image if that word describes the image. Of course, for a
child’s network to have the right links, the child must be looking at the image that matches the word(s).
In this respect, our approach is consistent with the view that joint attention and social orientation are
critical for word learning [Bloom 2001].
More relevant data is also likely to lead to smaller sequences, since with more data, there will be
more opportunity to detect similarities, so more sequences will be divided into subsequences before
reaching the weight threshold. However, it is not just the quantity of data that matters, but the rate
at which it arrives and its distribution over time. Given the decay process, if data arrives too slowly,
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is not necessarily good either. For example, if a data sequence is frequently reinforced before similar
sequences are observed, it will be ﬁxated before it has a chance to be broken up. Thus, there is a critical
window of time during which sequences can be compared and broken into subsequences before they are
forgotten or ﬁxate.
To summarize, decay and ﬁxation combined with “normal” observations should result in “natural”
units (single words like “dog”, “cat”, and “Jon” and corresponding visual images) becoming ﬁxated,
and errors decaying, while inappropriate distributions of data sequences can lead to somewhat arbitrary
data sequences becoming ﬁxated, even if all the processes are working correctly. In addition, as we
suggested above, a network constructed from appropriate data should help the search process (both
because there will be “better” is-a hierarchies and because there will be more links between relevant
related items). Moreover, a well-constructed network helps provide context. That is, if a node like “cat”
is accessed, then we would expect there to be links with high weights from “cat” to other nodes like
“milk”, “mouse”, and “Scout” (the name of a speciﬁc cat) as well as the appropriate visual images.
There would also be links with perhaps lower weights to “tree”, “climb”, and “bird” and their related
visual images. On the other hand, we would expect very weak links (or no links at all) to “kangaroo”,
“car”, or to actions like “read” or “drive”. Clearly, the outcome is likely to be quite different if a network
is constructed from inappropriate data. As we argued brieﬂy above (and illustrate in much more detail
in the following sections), inappropriate data distributions can result in segmentation problems that lead
to poor network representation. The poor network representation, in turn, can produce the three core
deﬁcits of autism.
Although there are clearly many details that need to be ﬂeshed out, the model has a number of
appealing features. For one thing, although it is relatively simple, it is the ﬁrst to provide a principled
developmental mechanism able to explain many of the symptoms observed with autism. Moreover, it
suggests why intensive early-intervention programs—the method currently considered most effective
for dealing with autism—are effective: they help autistic children to acquire the intensive ﬂow of data
that typical children acquire spontaneously.
To the extent that the model we present is accurate, then we would almost certainly expect there to
be a disorder corresponding to the breakdown of the processes that we have sketched; we happen to give
the name “autism” to that disorder. The similarity between the “autism” that our model predicts and the
symptoms of autism that are actually observed provides support for the model. Note that our model is
compatible with the view that autism has a genetic basis—indeed, it suggests that the genetic cause(s)
of autism affect mechanisms that inﬂuence data acquisition.
The idea that primary deﬁcits related to joint attention and social orientation may be the cause for
autism is not new (see [Mundy 1995; Bushwick 2001] for attempts to explain autism along somewhat
similar lines). However, in our model, we deﬁne these primary deﬁcits in terms of data-acquisition
problems, andprovide aclearer developmentalmechanismthat explainshow suchprimary problemscan
generate the core deﬁcits of autism and other related symptoms. Note that our approach is different from
a static neuropsychological deﬁcit approach, in which the brain is characterized in terms of a normal
brain with some parts or “modules” impaired [Shallice 1988; Temple 1997]. Instead, it resembles recent
approaches that view developmental disorders as deviations in developmental trajectories that lead to
brain abnormalities [Oliver et al. 2000; Johnson 2000; Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith 2002] (see also
[Pierce et al. 2001; Miller et al. 2003] for supporting evidence).
Our model has features that appear in many other frameworks, such as neural nets, statistical learn-
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embedded in one of these frameworks. However, we believe that attempting to do so at this stage would
be premature for two reasons. First, some critical elements in our model, such as the active selection
of data input, and the dynamic interaction between the window of decay and ﬁxation and the segmen-
tation process, simply have no analogues in other current frameworks. Second, we have attempted to
build a high-level theory that uses the minimum number of principles necessary to explain the observed
phenomena. Embedding our approach into another would require additional, perhaps unnecessary, as-
sumptions. We do cite some of these other frameworks at various points in the paper, but given the vast
quantity of literature, our comparison is rather cursory.
The possibility that an inappropriate network may explain some cognitive characteristics of autism
has been suggested by several neural net models [Cohen 1994; Gustafsson 1997; McClelland 2000;
Gustafsson and Paplinski 2004]. Our model provides more of a causal explanation of how an inap-
propriate network may develop. We also use it to explain a far broader set of phenomena associated
with autism. In fact, we claim that much of what is known about autism can be explained in terms of
our model; this point is discussed in great detail in Section 3. We recognize that some of the mecha-
nisms that have been suggested in the neural-net models mentioned above may be consistent with, or
incorporated in, our framework. For example, excessive lateral inhibition [Gustafsson 1997] may be a
possible cause of the abnormalities of the initial network in our framework. There are also some sim-
ilarities between the idea that learning with familiarity preference can generate inappropriate networks
[Gustafsson and Paplinski 2004] and our idea that an individual whose network has nodes labeled by
long data sequences is likely to focus on objects with similar “large” labels, and therefore, his network
will not develop in a typical way.
While our main goal in constructing the basic model is to use it to explain autism, the model itself, if
correct, should also be consistent with the large body of evidence in the ﬁeld of language acquisition and
cognitive development. A comprehensive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the paper. Never-
theless, our model does in fact seem to be consistent with many recent ﬁndings. For example, it should
be clear that our model is compatible with statistical learning. As we have observed, the weights on
the nodes and links can be viewed as representing the statistical frequency of observing data sequences
and the frequency of their association with each other. Evidence for statistical learning by 8-month-old
infants suggests that they are capable of using transition probabilities for word segmentation [Saffran
et al. 1996; Aslin et al. 1998]. Although in our model we do not specify an algorithm that monitors
transition probabilities, the algorithm that breaks up data sequences based on shared components does
much the same work. It breaks up data sequences into smaller subsequences if the transition probabil-
ity between the subsequences is relatively low, and tends to keep sequences together if their transition
probability is relatively high. This is because a low transition probability implies a higher probability of
acquiring data with matching segments before the sequence as a whole reaches ﬁxation. For example,
the transition probability between “Jon” and “drinks” in “Jon-drinks” is likely to be considerably lower
than the transition probability between “cof” and “fee” in a natural word like “coffee”, given the likely
transitions from “Jon” to “eats” and from “Dan” to “drinks”. Thus, there is a good chance that the se-
quence “Jon-drinks” will be broken by the sequence “Jon-eats” before it gets ﬁxated. On the other hand,
“coffee” is likely to reach ﬁxation before there is an attempt to break it up by a word like “toffee” or
“cofﬁn”. This example also illustrates the importance of the time window between decay and ﬁxation.
Thus, our model would predict exactly the same results as those reported by Saffran et al. [1996].
More sophisticated forms of statistical learning can also be supported by our model. For example,
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the ﬁrst and third words in a sentence even when the second word is unpredictable. Such learning can
occur in our model as a result of having links between all data units that appeared in the same data
sequence before segmentation. The fact that dependencies between adjacent words can be learned at
a much younger age then long-distance dependencies is not predicted by our basic model. However,
it can be incorporated into the model by assuming that early in infancy weights decay more rapidly,
causing infants to keep links only within very short data sequences, which are likely to be heard more
often. Having such a mechanism can help in building a “better” network by ensuring that, early in
development, small data units, like words, reach ﬁxation before they can be “locked” into commonly-
used phrases.
Our model does not have a hard-wired innate “universal grammar” module in the sense of Chomsky
[Chomsky 1965; Pinker 1994]. Nevertheless, we believe that it is consistent with (and, indeed, provides
a framework for) statistical, data-driven language acquisition, in the spirit of recent work in the area (see
[Elman 1990; Elman 1999; Pullum 1996; Solan et al. 2005] and recent evidence reviewed by Tomasello
[2000]).
Not only is our model compatible with statistical learning, it is also compatible with reinforcement
learning. All we need to assume is that some nodes can be associated with positive or negative conno-
tation (perhaps by being linked to appropriate centers in the brain, so that they can act as reinforcers or
motivators). We do not go into further details here.
Finally, we observe that the basic model we have described has many similarities with work on
chunking [Gobet et al. 2001], as well as with approaches that use recurrent neural nets to ﬁnd words
and syntactic structures in time (e.g., [Elman 1990]). Our model is different from models of chunking
mainly because it assumes a mechanism that builds the network by breaking up data sequences, and by
having a dynamic system of weights that allows modiﬁcation of the network, and creates the critical
window between decay and ﬁxation. In contrast to neural nets, we assume that nodes represent real-
world phenomena directly. (Of course, patterns of nodes can be viewed as representing more complex
phenomena. For example, seeing Dan’s blue T-shirt will stimulate a number of nodes.) Nevertheless,
assuming that nodes are directly related to real-world phenomena suggests certain algorithms for break-
ing data sequences and ﬁnding commonalities between sequences that would not be as appropriate (and,
we believe, more difﬁcult to implement) in the more standard neural network setting.
3 The Effects of Data-Acquisition Problems
As we suggested in the introduction, given the importance of getting appropriate data, we would expect
there to be some disorder associated with a defect in the data-acquisition stage. If it were not autism,
it would have been something else. Moreover, as we have argued, some of the symptoms of autism
do indeed suggest that autistic individuals suffer from data-acquisition problems. In this section we
show how our model can explain the main cognitive deﬁcits associated with autism. For simplicity, the
discussion here is couched in terms of verbal utterances, but the same comments apply to visual scenes
as well.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize the effect of the observations. Given what we know about the data
distribution of autistic children, we would expect that the verbal utterances associated with nodes in
the network of autistic children contain relatively more phrases that have not been broken up into their
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normal children, with strong links (i.e., links with high weight) between nodes in a cluster and weak
links between nodes outside a cluster. For example, words or phrases that appear repeatedly in a song or
story that the child particularly likes and thus pays attention to will be strongly linked to each other, but
not to other words or phrases to which they are likely to have links in normal children.Because longer
phrases are associated with nodes, and longer phrases are less likely to be similar to each other than
individual words are, fewer nodes will be identiﬁed as similar and be uniﬁed through the coalescence
process. As a result, we would expect that, in order to represent the same amount of data, the network of
an autistic child would typically have more nodes than that of a normal child, and these nodes are also
likely to be labeled by longer, more idiosyncractic data sequences. Moreover, while the overall number
of links in the network of an autistic child might be larger than the number of links in the network of a
normal child (because the autistic network has more nodes), the number of links to each individual node
is likely to be smaller, since fewer nodes are viewed as similar.
Since the network of an autistic child is composed of large components (either nodes labeled by
long data sequences or large clusters) that “lock” smaller words or images inside them, it represents the
world in a fragmented and inﬂexible way. A natural unit like “dog” will appear in a number of clusters
(for example, a cluster associated with a song that mentions a dog, another cluster with a story involving
a dog, and so on). There will be strong links from an occurrence of “dog” in a cluster to all the other
nodes in that structure, but only weak links to nodes associated with dogs in other clusters. An autistic
individual might store the word “dog” in many different clusters, much as a normal individual might
store the syllable “car” within different words like “carpenter”, “carnival”, or “carnivore” in different
clusters. Moreover, since the links emanating from the various “dog” nodes will lead to quite different
nodes, these nodes will not be generalized to a notion of “dog”. The strong links within a cluster offer
immediate access to what the dog has done in that cluster, but hampers the search for “dog” in other
clusters that may suggest what else the dog could do. In such a network, search, retrieval, or simulation
within a cluster is easy, but search, retrieval or recombination of components from different clusters
is difﬁcult. As a result, generalization in such a network will be more difﬁcult, local processing will
be easier than global processing, and rigidity and perseveration will be more likely than ﬂexibility and
creativity. In other words, this network can be expected to produce what some workers view as an
autistic cognitive style [Frith 1989; Happ´ e 1999; Russell 1997].
The fragmented nature of the network of an autistic child may also explain why autism looks like
a state of retarded concept formation [Snyder et al. 2004]. The process described by Snyder et al. of
forming concepts and metaconcepts from collections of sensory details is somewhat analogous to that
of generalization and building is-a hierarchies. If sensory details are locked in their original sequences,
the only concepts that can be formed are those that describe precisely the way these details were ﬁrst
observed. (See also Section 3.4, where we relate this issue to the phenomenon of autistic savants.)
We now discuss how these properties of the network can lead to the cognitive deﬁcits associated
with the three leading theories of autism. We deal with each of them in turn.
3.1 Theory of Mind
One central core deﬁcit in autism is impaired theory of mind, sometimes known as mind-blindness
[Baron-Cohen 2000; Frith 2001]. This core deﬁcit refers to the inability of autistic individuals to at-
tribute mental states to others and to predict their thoughts and feelings. Recent neurological research
16associates particular brain areas with the ability to mind read or to mentalize, and suggests that neu-
roanatomical abnormalities in these parts of the brain may be responsible for mentalizing failure in
autism [Frith 2001; Gallagher and Frith 2003]. The possibility that mentalizing is carried out by spe-
cialized modules in certain parts of the brain is reasonable. However, thinking in terms of specialized
brain modules does not completely explain exactly what goes wrong in autism.
The cognitive mechanism of mentalizing is not clear. It is quite evident that both animals and
humans have basic mechanisms that allow them to make some predictions about future behaviors of
other individuals, including that of rivals or predators [Hasson 1991; Shettleworth 1998; Zahavi and
Zahavi 1997]. This basic ability, which is also viewed as “mind reading” by behavioral ecologists
(e.g., [Krebs and Dawkins 1984]), may be facilitated by an innate tendency to follow the eye gaze
of others [Emery 2000] or to imitate [Heyes 2001], or it may be based on experience [Emery and
Clayton 2001]. However, discussions of theory of mind usually consider a higher cognitive ability that
is more sophisticated then predicting someone’s behavior based on some cues. Humans (and possibly
some primates) are postulated to have cognitive representations of the “mental states” of others; that
is, a “theory of their mind” [Baron-Cohen 2000; Leslie 1987]. Researchers in the ﬁeld argue that
the representation of mental states must somehow be decoupled from the representation of the real
world, and should be marked “in quotes” to signify that they represent someone’s mental states rather
than real physical facts [Frith 2001; Leslie 1987]. The crucial problem, left unexplained, is how a
neural mechanism can possibly acquire the necessary information for decoupling representations and
identifying them correctly as “mental” versus “physical”.
For example, it has been shown that by 18 months of age, a child who watches his mother using
a banana as a telephone will know that she is pretending [Frith 2001, p. 970]. Even if we assume
the existence of a highly sophisticated neural system that has evolved speciﬁcally for these tasks, there
is still a problem of explaining how such a system can tell that in this case the banana is intended
to represent a telephone, and not the other way around. Since a telephone is a recent innovation in
terms of human evolution, the recognition of a mother’s intentions regarding the banana could not be
innate. This is different from cases such as an animal’s escape response to a predator’s eye gaze [Zahavi
and Zahavi 1997], where the recognition of the predator’s intentions towards its prey could, at least in
theory, be innate. Thus, to explain the more advanced mentalizing abilities of children, we must propose
a mechanism that interacts with the environment and learns to identify a wide range of possible mental
states and attitudes. We now consider in more detail how the network can support the attribution of
mental states to others, how it can be used to understand pretend play and false beliefs, and why all
these abilities are likely to be impaired in autism as a result of having an abnormal network.
Attributing mental states to others: Attributing mental states to others is a necessary ﬁrst step in
developing a theory of mind. Only then can these mental states be monitored and aggregated to create
a more complex mental map of others’ attitudes and thoughts. Although we can never feel the pain,
the emotions, the thoughts, or the desires of other people, there is accumulating evidence that when we
observe other people in a particular context we can simulate our own feelings in the same context and
attribute them to the observed individuals [Ramnani and Miall 2004; Singer et al. 2004]. However,
there are good reasons to believe that this ability is switched on only after making the appropriate
generalization: classifying the observed individuals as people like oneself. Unless such a generalization
is in effect, there is nothing preventing us from attributing our feelings to a washing machine or a
pocket calculator. We do not expect mentalization to be immediate; it depends on the appropriate
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For example, if Jon has learned that Dan has many of the same links to actions and attributes that he
himself has, he can generalize that when Dan falls on the ﬂoor, he will also feel pain, or that when Dan
looks at the ball, he also sees the ball. More precisely, in Jon’s network, there is a node representing the
general concept of a boy, which has links to Jon himself, and to other boys like Dan, and to attributes
or actions that boys have, or can do. Based on Jon’s own experience with mental states he can now
attribute such mental states to all boys.
In order to generalize appropriately, the appropriate units must be available. That is, it is impossible
to have a concept of “boy” (that can feel pain and see a ball) unless the network has nodes for individual
boys like “Dan” and “Jon”. Moreover, in order to recognize that “Jon” and “Dan” belong to the same
category (i.e., to establish an “is-a” link from each of them to the node representing the general concept
of a boy), they must share at least a certain number of features in common. Thus, appropriate data
acquisition is critical for both the initial identiﬁcation of the individual units like “Jon” and “Dan” (oth-
erwise the data sequences will decay or reach ﬁxation before being broken up) and for the accumulation
of sufﬁcient data about them.
This explains why autistic individuals have difﬁculty with the basic ability of attributing mental
states to others. In the most extreme case, young autistic children that have little interest in other people
might still be at a stage where they do not even classify an individual like Dan as a boy, and therefore
would not associate certain observations of Dan with the appropriate mental state that they themselves
may experience in a similar context. In terms of our network model, the node representing “Dan” may
not be linked to a node that represents the concept “boy”, either because there was too little data to
create such a node in the ﬁrst place, or because not enough data was collected speciﬁcally about Dan to
establish a link from the node “Dan” to the node “boy” (if such a node already exists in the network).
In either case, the result is that there will be no links that can eventually lead from “Dan” to the mental
states experienced by the autistic individual in a similar context.
In the more benign cases, autistic individuals may be able to categorize an individual like Dan as
a boy, but might still have difﬁculty in identifying his mental states. One reason is that the fragmented
nature of the autistic network might result in there being several nodes that represent the concept “boy”,
but each may be linked to a limited set of mental states. Dan, for example, may be matched with a
particular node labeled “boy” (or, perhaps better, “boy1”, to distinguish it from other nodes associated
with boy-like features) that is linked to sport activities and with mental states like “happiness after
wining a soccer game” or “desire to kick a ball”. However, “boy1” may not be linked to a mental state
such as “likes cars”, which may in fact be linked to another node “boy2” representing the generalization
of different boys.
A second reason for difﬁculties in attributing mental states to others is that even when Dan, for
example, is classiﬁed correctly as a boy, and even if an autistic individual recognizes that he himself
is also a “boy”, the node representing the concept “boy” in the autistic network may not be linked to
many potential mental states. This is because autistic individuals do not make many observations of
the behavior of other boys that results in such links. For example, Jon, an autistic individual, may
classify Dan as a boy because he looks like a boy, talks like a boy, and is very similar to a group of
other individuals who were called “boy” by his mother. Yet, because Jon was never really interested in
the behavior of these boys he is not aware, for example, that boys usually scream or protest when they
fail to get what they want—which is exactly what he, Jon, does in the same context. Thus, while Jon
associates the situation that produced the scream with the feeling of “anger” for himself, he will not be
18able to identify the similarities in behavior and context, and thus infer that perhaps other boys can feel
“anger” too. That is, in Jon’s network, there will be links between “Jon” and “anger” and between “Jon”
and “boy”, but not between “boy” and “anger”.
With sufﬁcient experience, even an autistic individual may be able to create links between “boys”
and “anger”, but these links are likely to be much weaker than for normal individuals. The probability of
following such weaker links is lower. So, in practice, that means that autistic individuals are less likely
to attribute mental state spontaneously or easily, although they might be able to do so upon request and
with some effort.
Understanding pretend play: There are a number of issues involved with pretending. The ability to
pretend in the sense of deceiving someone else is more related to the ability to understand false beliefs,
which will be discussed in the next subsection. Here we focus on the ability to understand pretend or
imaginative play.
Consider the example mentioned earlier of a child who watches his mother using a banana as a
telephone. Based on Leslie’s [1987] approach, Frith [2001] suggested that in order to understand that
his mother is pretending, the child has to understand her mental attitude towards the banana (i.e., that
she wants to pretend that the banana is a telephone). To achieve this, the child needs to decouple the
secondary representation of the banana as a telephone from its primary representation as an edible fruit,
and to remember somehow that the secondary representation is limited to the context of his mother’s
pretend play. We now show how our model can explain how this can be done, and why it is likely to be
difﬁcult for autistic children.
In the network of a nonautistic child, there is already at least one cluster of nodes representing
previous observations of people talking over the phone. It includes nodes representing the sounds and
the visual scenes of a person talking and holding a telephone with links to a node representing the
telephone as an object. This cluster is probably also linked to nodes representing words and phrases like
“telephone”, “mom is on the phone”, or “let’s talk over the phone”. The child also has in his network
clusters that include a node representing “banana”. Most likely, the cluster that includes “banana” has
very few links to the cluster associated with using a telephone. At some point, the child encounters for
the ﬁrst time a situation in which his mother uses a banana as a telephone. It would appear that, based
on the information in his network, there is not much he can do except to treat this new scenario as a
rare but real combination in which mom is using a banana to talk over the phone. In fact, we would
argue that if the mother was pretending very well, and using the banana exactly as she uses a telephone
(without giving special attention or hints to the child), the child may well be fooled into believing that
bananas can occasionally be used as telephones, at least by his mother.
However, when engaging in pretend play with a child, many additional cues are provided. For
example, a mother may be sitting with her child on a carpet, playing with other toys (most of which
are themselves pretend objects, such as animals or people), and suddenly start using the banana as a
telephone while still keeping her typical play intonation. Moreover, we claim that these cues can often
be matched and linked to cues in other nodes in the network that are associated with some general
features of typical pretend play. To justify this claim, we must explain how typical features of pretend
play could become labels of nodes in the network in the ﬁrst place. We do not want to assume that
they were there initially, nor that there is a genetic program that deﬁnes “pretend”. Rather, we suggest
that this concept is developed in the network just like any other concept: by acquiring data and building
appropriate links that eventually establish two parallel subnetworks, one for real scenarios and one for
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For example, a child typically acquires a great deal of data about people driving and using real cars,
and about similar scenarios in which people, and especially children, use toy cars. The two parallel
behaviors share many similarities, so many of their nodes will be linked, or even shared. Yet, each set
of behaviors also has some unique features. For example, toy cars are smaller, are used mostly in the
play room, and are associated with some unique words like “toy”. In fact, quite early in life the child
may hear words or phrases such as “real” versus “not real” or “pretend” or “it is just a toy”, and will
learn to associate them with the right sets of objects and behaviors. Toy cars are obviously just one
example. There are dolls, puppets, little houses, pretend food, and even a pretend telephone. So, by the
time that a child is faced with his mother using a banana as a telephone (at 18 months in Frith’s [2001]
experiments), he already has a fairly rich representation in his network of real versus pretend scenarios,
with links to the appropriate words describing each set.
Now we can return to the child’s ability to understand his mother’s pretend play where she is using a
banana as a telephone. While the mother’s behavior is clearly similar to using a telephone, it is missing
the match with a real telephone. Moreover, it has several contextual and stylistic features that make it
similar to typical play. As we explained above, the child can probably ﬁnd in his network many cases
in which play behavior paralleled a real scenario, and where mimicking reality was part of the game.
Based on the structural similarity of these pretend situations to the current situation, the child is likely
to infer that his mother’s behavior is an instance of pretend play. (This inference would, of course, be
particularly easy if the child had already played with a toy telephone before.)
Note that making such an inference requires an “is-a” link to be established, and to conclude that a
new situation “is-a” pretend play, without ever being told so explicitly. The generalization mechanism
is exactly the one discussed earlier in the context of attributing mental states to others. At some point,
when the situation is sufﬁciently similar to other instances of pretend play, the child concludes that
this is also an instance of pretend play. One implication of our model is that recognizing the situation
as pretend play comes ﬁrst; based on this recognition, the child can then conclude that his mother is
pretending, or that she is treating the banana as a telephone. This is quite different from the approach
according to which the child somehow reads his mother’s mind and understands that she is pretending,
and thus that the whole situation is an instance of pretend play. In our view, because a child cannot
really read his mother’s thoughts, the only feasible way to infer her mental attitudes is by reading the
situation and the context, and ﬁtting them to similar situations.
We can now see why autistic individuals are likely to have problems in understanding pretend play.
First, as in the case of attributing mental states to others, inferring that a novel situation is an instance of
pretend play depends critically on having sufﬁcient data to conclude that the novel situation is “similar
enough” to other known forms of pretend play. Autistic children who fail to acquire sufﬁcient data
about the basic forms of pretend play will not be able to generalize the concept of pretend play to more
sophisticated games. Second, the units that are being compared in the case of pretend play are large
clustersofnodesthatrepresentcomplexsituations. Thetaskofﬁndingsimilaritiesbetweensuchclusters
will be especially difﬁcult for autistic children because, in their network, such observations are likely
to be stored in different clusters of nodes, with little linkage between these different clusters. In other
words, understanding that a situation is pretend play requires putting it in the context of pretend play.
As we discuss extensively in Section 3.2, putting things in context is very difﬁcult with the fragmented
network of autistic individuals.
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theory of mind goes beyond the ability of attributing mental states to others, or the ability to distinguish
reality and pretense. By the age of four, nonautistic children appear to be able to monitor the mental
states of others and to create a mental map, or a theory about what other people see, know, believe,
or even feel [Baron-Cohen 2000]. The most notable evidence for this skill is the child’s ability to
understand false beliefs. This is probably the major stepping stone to more sophisticated behaviors
involving the ability to tell lies and to manipulate the knowledge or the mental states of others. One
of the special requirements for achieving a theory of mind is the ability to separate between one’s own
knowledge about the world and the knowledge attributed to someone else [Birch and Bloom 2001]. By
analogy, this is like having separate “folders” in a computer in which we store and update data about
different peoples’ attributes, knowledge, and mental states. Having a theory of mind has therefore been
viewed as an advanced cognitive skill that may require unique modalities [Frith 2001]. While we agree
that developing a theory of mind is a highly nontrivial process, we do not believe that it should require
any special mechanisms beyond those considered already in our model.
In our model, a “folder” is nothing more than a node with many outgoing links. For example,
a folder for “Dan” is just a node labeled “Dan” with links to nodes that, intuitively, give information
about Dan. Once a child reaches the stage where he is attributing mental states to others, there is nothing
to prevent another child’s mental state from being included in the folder associated with that child. For
example, if smiling faces are associated with the mental state of being happy, when Jon meets a new
child in the playground with a smiling face, the mental state of being happy would be linked to this new
child, just like his dark hair and green shirt.
One key use of these folders is to construct (portions of) the networks of others. For example, if
Jon sees Dan staring at a ball in a box, and Jon knows that when he (Jon) looks at a ball he adds a link
from the ball to the box in his (Jon’s) network, he may infer that Dan adds a link from the ball to the
box in his (Dan’s) network. Thus, Jon starts to build a rudimentary representation of Dan’s network in
the Dan folder. A more sophisticated problem is that of representing that Dan knows about things Jon
does not know about. For example, if Dan looks in a box and Jon does not know what is in the box, Jon
has to represent (in his representation of Dan’s network), that Dan knows what is in the box, although
Jon does not. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details of how this could be
done, we remark that the standard representations of knowledge in the philosophy and computer science
communities using graphical structures usually called Kripke structures (see [Fagin et al. 1995]) can
easily be embedded in the networks we have constructed.
With this view in mind, we can now consider the task of understanding false beliefs, and the rea-
sons for its impairment in autistic individuals. For concreteness, we focus our discussion on the most
commonly-cited false-belief test, which is the Sally-Anne task [Baron-Cohen et al. 1986]. In this task,
a child is presented with a scenario involving two girls, Sally and Anne, and a ball, a basket, and a box.
The scenario is presented using puppets or illustrations that describe the following sequence of events.
Sally puts her ball in the basket, and then goes away. After Sally has left, Anne moves the ball to the
box. When Sally returns, the child is asked where Sally will look for the ball. By providing the correct
answer (“in the basket”), the child shows that he is able to identify Sally’s false belief that the ball is
still in the basket.
Answering a question such as “Where is the ball?” essentially amounts to using the network to
perform goal-directed behavior. However, to answer a question like “Where will Sally look for the
ball?” requires the child to perform the goal-directed behavior in his representation of Sally’s network.
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realization that he searches his own network to answer such questions to the fact that all children use
their networks to answer such questions. Of course, to make such a generalization, the child must
already have a relatively sophisticated representation of other children’s networks. Since, as we have
already argued, autistic children are likely to have a rather poor representation of other children’s mental
states, it is not surprising that they come by this realization relatively late, if at all. But even if the child
does realize that it is necessary to search (his representation of) Sally’s network to answer the question,
this is likely to be a more difﬁcult question for the autistic child than for a normal child, again because
an autistic child is likely to have a poor representation of what Sally knows. The fact that autistic
children are typically less interested in faces and people will make them less likely to store the relevant
information about Sally. Finally, even if they have the relevant information, they might not have made
the generalization from the fact that they search for an object the last place they saw it to the fact that
others also search for objects the last place they saw them.
Many features of the network have to work together in order to support a theory of mind. It is
necessary to identify individuals, accumulate sufﬁcient data about individuals in order to be able to
generalize and to infer their mental states, and then have enough data to draw inferences about things
like reality vs. pretense and typical behaviors (like looking for something where it was last known to
be). Given all these requirements, it is perhaps not surprising that some deﬁcits in theory of mind can
characterize even the most highly-functioning autistic individuals. Impaired theory of mind can thus be
viewed not as a primary problem, but as an unavoidable symptom of a data-acquisition disorder.
3.2 Weak Central Coherence
The term “weak central coherence” has been attributed to a broad set of experimental ﬁndings, showing
how the performance of autistic and non-autistic individuals differs, mainly in the perceptual domain
(see the review by Happ´ e and Frith [2006]. Typically it refers to the superior ability of autistic individ-
uals to process details, and their relative impairment in extracting global meaning [Frith 1989; Happ´ e
1999]. The exact mechanisms involved, and the relationships between enhanced local processing and
reduced global processing are still unclear [Happ´ e and Frith 2006; Mottron et al. 2006; Plaisted et al.
2006]. Weak central coherence has also been used to describe the impaired ability to put new data in
context [Frith 1989; Happ´ e 1999]. As we now show, this impaired ability is in fact predicted by our
theory. With a few further assumptions, we can also show that the differences between autistic and
non-autistic individuals in extracting details and getting the big picture follow from this impairment.
The structure of the “abnormal” network of autistic children suggested by our model makes it difﬁ-
cult to put new data in context. To see why, suppose that an individual tries to understand a word like
“dog”. He presumably hears the word and then scans his network to ﬁnd the most similar nodes, that
is, nodes associated with the word “dog” or a similar-sounding word. (Recall that we have assumed
that such similarity-based searches can be carried out.) For a young autistic child, there may not be any
exact match for “dog”, since the word has not yet formed a separate unit. Rather, the word will be a part
of a larger sequence (such as “See the dog”), which will make the similarity search more difﬁcult. For
an older child, on the other hand, the problem is that there may be an embarrassment of riches. Through
the years, such a child might have enough opportunities to form the word “dog” as a separate unit (either
by hearing it separately, or by breaking up a few larger sequences). In addition, “dog” may already have
been locked in a number of other clusters (far more than for a normal child). Hence, there may be many
exact matches for “dog”, each in its own cluster, that have not coalesced into a single node. We assume
22that one of these matches will be chosen, but it will not necessarily be the most appropriate one, given
the context. Since we expect that “understanding” will come by following links coming from the node
chosen, it is not as likely that an autistic child will have as good an understanding of “dog” in context
as a normal child. In particular, an autistic child will not have as rich a set of connections to “dog” as a
normal child.
It may well be that if one match does not succeed, an autistic child will try to ﬁnd another match. But
this process will take time, especially if there are many possible matches. The experimental evidence
also suggests that, at least in some cases, autistic children stop trying to ﬁnd matches before ﬁnding the
“right” match [Frith 1989; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 2001a]. It is also possible that, in some autistic
individuals, the repeated failure to put things into context attenuates the motivation to look for matching
data in old memory, thus creating a “lazy habit” to process information locally rather than globally. This
will weaken central coherence even further.
Interestingly, there is also evidence that autistic individuals often try to put things in context and
sometimes may be successful in doing this [Brian and Bryson 1996; Lopez and Leekam 2003; Mottron
et al. 1999; Ozonoff et al. 1994; Ropar and Mitchell 1999]. This apparent inconsistency is not surprising
if we do not view weak central coherence as a general cognitive style, but rather as the result of trying
to use context in an abnormal network. The failures to use context may then reﬂect abnormalities in the
part of the network needed for the relevant task. Different individuals may have different abnormalities,
depending on their particular developmental history.11
In the following, we review some of the evidence for weak central coherence in the literature and
show how it can be explained by our model.
• Hermelin and O’Connor [1967] observed that, in contrast to control subjects, autistic individuals
do not derive beneﬁt from meaning in memory tests. In particular, they do not recall words from
a sentence better than words from a random list of words. This can be explained using our model
as follows. We assume that when hearing a sentence such as “The cat climbed on the car” in a
memory test, a node labeled “sentence to memorize” is created, with pointers (links) to the ﬁrst
word (“The”), the second word (“cat”), and so on. Note that nodes associated with these words
are presumably already in the network. These words are not intended to be novel words; it is only
their co-occurrence in a particular combination of words that is new and needs to be memorized.
However, if the co-occurrence itself is not novel, then a nonautistic child will presumably already
have links between many of these nodes; for example, there is likely to already be a link between
“cat” and “climbed” and between “climbed” and “on the car” (or between “climbed” and “on”,
and between “on” and “the car”). Having these links will help in the recall task for a nonautistic
child. After recalling “The cat”, it will be easier for a nonautistic child to remember the rest of
the phrase, just by following pre-existing links. These will lead to a set of candidate words to
complete the sentence, from which the best match with recent memory can be selected.
By way of contrast, an autistic child is less likely to have such pre-existing links (or, if they exist,
they are likely to be weaker links). Even if he has a link between “cat” and “climbed” and a link
between “climbed” and “on the car”, these may be two different instances of “climbed” that have
not coalesced, so it will not be possible to follow the link from “cat” to “climbed” to “on the car”.
11Recall that the process of segmentation itself may be assisted by context. Thus, we may have a positive feedback cycle
here: basic segmentation problems can lead to a network representation that makes it difﬁcult to use context, which may in
turn further increase segmentation problems.
23Instead of recalling each word independently based only on its recent link (pointer) to the node
“sentence to memorize”, the pre-existing links can support additional recalling channels. On the
other hand, for a string of random words, autistic and nonautistic children are likely to be on an
equal footing when it comes to inter-word links.
So far we have considered only inter-word links. However, the recall of meaningful sentences
may also be helped by links between words and images and between those images. People fre-
quently visualize words and verbal descriptions; this visualization helps in memorization and
recall. Autistic individuals may also be impaired in this respect, due to the poor link structure
between nodes that represent words and nodes that represent visual images. While a nonautistic
child can easily visualize the sentence “The cat climbed on the car”, an autistic child may be un-
able to do so. Even if the word “cat” is associated with a particular image of a cat, this particular
image may be locked within a speciﬁc picture of, say, a cat sitting on the carpet, with no further
links to other cats climbing, and no other images of the act of climbing on a car.
• Frith and Snowling [1983] and Snowling and Frith [1986] showed that autistic individuals fail to
use context to resolve the pronunciation of homographs. For example, they have more difﬁculty
than normal individuals with the pronunciation of “tear” in “there was a big tear in her eye” and
“there was a big tear in her dress”. Typically, autistic readers respond with the most frequent
pronunciation for a homograph, regardless of context. A simple explanation of this is that autistic
individuals typically do not try to use context while reading [Frith 1989; Happ´ e 1999]. As we
mentioned earlier, such a “lazy habit” may be explained by our model as a secondary result
of repeated failures to put things into context in general. However, there may also be a direct
explanation. The fact that autistic individuals select the most frequent pronunciation suggests that
they try to use existing links in the network (i.e., to use context), but that the links available to
them may be different than those in a typical individual’s network.
In terms of our model, we would expect that the node corresponding to (the image of) the written
word“tear”islinkedtotwopossiblepronunciations. Thenodecorrespondingtothepronunciation
heard more frequently has, by deﬁnition, greater weight. When a nonautistic individual reads the
sentence “there was a big tear in her dress”, this frequency effect is outweighed by additional
link between the word “dress” and the appropriate (but less common) pronunciation of “tear”
(in a dress). In autistic individuals, on the other hand, the link between “dress” and the second
pronunciation of “tear” may be weak or not immediately accessible. Even if both “dress” and
“tear” are present somewhere in the network of the autistic individual, they might be represented
by nodes that have not coalesced, each still locked within a different cluster. Hence, although
reading the word “dress” may provide access to the visual image of a dress, and to other nodes
linked to a particular instance of a dress (like “you look very pretty in this dress”), it may not be
linked to the particular instance of “dress” that is linked to the the appropriate pronunciation of
“tear”. Without such a link, all that the autistic individual can do is to follow the stronger link
from the written “tear” to its more common pronunciation.
Interestingly, additional aspects of Frith and Snowling’s work may also be explained by this view
of “competition” among links. For example, they show that when autistic individuals ﬁll in a
blank in a sentence, they are able to use context for choosing a word from the correct syntactic
category, but usually fail to select the most appropriate word in terms of meaning (despite having
no problems in assigning semantic meaning to words). However, their performance improves
when their set of choices is restricted. To explain these ﬁndings in terms of our model, consider
24for example the task of ﬁlling in the blank in the following sentence: “He looked in the in
the riverbank” (used by Frith and Snowling [1983]). The algorithm that is used to search for the
appropriatewordinthenetworkislikelytobebasedonsearchingthenetworkforacertainamount
of time, and then selecting the word with the most “satisfying” combination of links to all other
units in the sentence. The degree to which a given set of nodes is most “satisfying” should clearly
be some increasing function of the number of links between nodes in the set and their weights.
A nonautistic individual may easily ﬁnd many links leading from a node labeled “looked-in-the”
to nodes like “box” or “basket”, but perhaps only one or two of them also have pre-existing
links leading to “riverbank”. These might be words such as “cracks” or “cave” that are linked
to “riverbank” (perhaps due to a cave having been seen in a riverbank on a TV program). It is
quite possible that the word “holes”, which is the original missing word in this sentence (which
was taken from a story about beavers), will not be found in the search and another word will be
selected.
Now consider an autistic individual who searches his network in a similar way, and puts in the
same amount of effort as a nonautistic individual. His chances of ﬁnding what we generally
consider a context-appropriate word are much lower. Even if he has heard many of the relevant
words, including many instances of “riverbank”, there might be several instances of “riverbank”
in his abnormal network that have not been coalesced. Hence, one “riverbank” he ﬁnds may
be locked in a cluster like “The boat approached the riverbank very slowly”, while another may
be locked in a cluster like “The children went swimming by the riverbank”, and so on. Based
on this search, among all words with links coming from “looked-in-the”, the word “boat” may
be the best choice, because it clearly also has a link to “riverbank”. The search is still likely
to lead to syntactically-appropriate words (as indeed observed by Frith and Snowling). This is
because the strongest combination of links coming in this case from “looked” are likely to be to
a syntactically-appropriate word like “boat” rather than to words like “approached” or “slowly”.
Past experience with a data sequence like “looked in the boat” is much more probable than with a
sequence like “looked in the approached” or “looked in the slowly”. (Note that the knowledge of
grammar in our model is also data-driven.)
Finally, we have to explain how restricted choice can help autistic children to ﬁnd the context-
appropriate word. Consider again the sentence above, this time with the restricted choice offered
to the children: “He looked in the holes/drawers/books in the riverbank” [Frith and Snowling
1983]. In this case, the competition between the strongest combinations of links is limited to
the three options. This helps in two ways: First, searching backward from the possible solution
may give access to the more relevant (albeit weaker) links much faster. Second, in the abnormal
network of autistic individuals, there may be alternative combinations of links that are stronger
than the correct one; the restricted choice helps eliminate them. For example, for an autistic per-
son, the ﬁrst easily accessible instance of “riverbank” found in the limited search may be the one
linked to the word “boat”, while another instance of “riverbank” that is in fact linked to the correct
solution “holes” will not be accessed due to its lower weight in memory. (This problem does not
exist in a normal network, where all nodes labeled “riverbank” are likely have been coalesced.)
The restricted choice forces the autistic individual to disregard the ﬁrst accessible solution and to
search only among combinations that include the three solutions. This may actually prolong the
search (as indeed reported by Frith and Snowling [1983, Table 7]), but helps an autistic child to
perform at above-chance level.
25• Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen [2001b] report that adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger
syndrome show poor performance (relative to controls) in their ability to integrate a few visual
objects (drawings) into one coherent scene, or to identify the meaning of a scene, and to spot the
odd object in this scene. Most of the tested individuals were eventually able to perform most of
the tasks, but only after more time and with much greater effort than the controls. Jolliffe and
Baron-Cohen conclude that the greater effort needed for autistic subjects results in their tending
not to process in context unless they are instructed to do so or they consciously decide to do so.
However, they do not explain why it is so difﬁcult for autistic individuals to process in context.
To explain these results with our model, consider ﬁrst the experiment in which the subjects had to
integrate four out of ﬁve line drawings into a single coherent scene, and to identify the incongruent
drawing among those ﬁve (the one not needed for the coherent scene). More speciﬁcally, we focus
on an example in which there are ﬁve drawings: a boy, a ball, a dog, a tin can, and a fence. The
“correct” answer involved forming a scene of a boy throwing a ball to knock cans off a fence
(leaving “dog” as the incongruent object). This problem requires searching the network to ﬁnd
the strongest combination of pre-existing links that can integrate four of the ﬁve objects. For a
nonautistic individual, the strongest combination is indeed likely to represent the most reasonable
scene, because the weight of the links is based on past co-occurrence of sequences. However,
making use of these links in the abnormal network of autistic individuals is likely to be much
more difﬁcult. As we observed in Section 2.2, for an autistic individual, nodes such as “dog” are
likely to appear repeatedly in the network, each time locked in a cluster with only a few links to
other nodes. This will make ﬁnding the best combination much harder. For example, to compute
the strength of the combination of “dog” and “fence” will require looking at all instances of “dog”
and “fence” in the network. In addition, since the network of an autistic individual is likely to be
based on an abnormal distribution of data sequences, the strongest combination of links may not
reﬂect correctly the most likely co-occurrence of pictures in reality.
All the other experimental results reported by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen [2001b] can be explained
by our model in a similar way.
• In a related paper, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen [2001a] provide evidence regarding some even more
basic aspects of visual processing. They show that autistic individuals have difﬁculty integrating
fragments of a composed object and identifying its holistic meaning. For example, given separate
drawings of a hinge pin and two rectangular plates, they have difﬁculty integrating them to form a
hinge [Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 2001a, p. 215]. However, their ability to identify an object based
on the visual image of a broken piece of that object (e.g., a tip of a key) is unimpaired.
To explain these results with our model, consider ﬁrst how visual images are stored in the network
of nonautistic individuals. Most newly-observed images are actually composed of components
that have been seen before. As a result, according to our model, they will be broken by the data-
processing algorithms and stored as clusters of nodes with the appropriate links between them.
(The idea that image representation is based on feature integration is not unique to our model;
see, for example, [Treisman and Gelade 1980; Cave and Franzel 1989].)
By analogy with verbal data, in many cases, a visual image will be stored in the network not
as a single word, but as a sentence or even a paragraph. For example, a bus may be stored
as wheels (or even circles) linked to a box that is also linked to a row of small squares (the
windows), and a “train” may be stored as a chain of such “buses”. This type of representation
26allows components to be reused, making for greater efﬁciency. In autistic individuals, however,
the situation is somewhat different. Each node in their network is likely to represent a longer data
sequence.
Now consider Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen’s example of identifying a hinge. If in a nonautistic
individual the image of this hinge is stored as a cluster of nodes consisting of a “pin” linked to
two “rectangular plates”, then there is a good chance that the fragments in the drawing will be
matched with nodes labeled by similar images in the network. Integrating the fragments (which
are now represented by nodes) into a single coherent object can then be done by ﬁnding the
strongest combination of links that connects all three visual nodes together, and by naming this
object using additional links to a common node at the verbal level.
For this process to work, all the relevant instances of “rounded pins” or “rectangular plates” in
the network must be either linked or coalesced. This important requirement is exactly what is
not typically achieved in the fragmented network of autistic individuals. In the extreme case, the
composed image (i.e., the hinge) may be stored as a single node, without any links between its
potential fragments. Even if the image of the hinge actually consists of several components, the
fragmented nature of the network makes it unlikely that the ﬁrst match of the drawing fragments
will be with the particular pin and plates that form the required cluster of a hinge. Due to the
limited degree of coalescing in the network of an autistic individual, there are likely to be multiple
representation of “pin” and “plate”.
This problem should disappear if a fragment is sufﬁciently rare and unique that only one node
in the network can be found as a reasonable match. In this case, upon ﬁnding the node, it can
be linked only to the single possible target object. This explains Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen’s
observationsthatautisticindividualswereunimpairedwhenthefragmentsusedintheexperiments
were no longer separate components, but rather a unique part of an object, such as the broken tip
of a key.
• One of the most frequently-quoted examples related to weak central coherence is the superior
performance of autistic individuals on the embedded-ﬁgure test [Shah and Frith 1983; Happ´ e
1999]. For example, autistic individuals may be better than controls at ﬁnding a hidden shape,
like a triangle, within a drawing of a baby carriage (see [Happ´ e 1999, Figure 3]). To explain
this enigma, it has been suggested that autistic individuals are not seduced by the gestalt of the
main object, and ﬁnd the parts as salient as the whole [Shah and Frith 1983]. However, no
speciﬁc mechanism has been proposed to explain how autistic individuals can see the parts so
easily. Based on our model, we suggest that autistic and nonautistic individuals may differ in
their performance on this task because they are likely to differ in the way they segment the salient
object into parts.
We expect that, in the network of nonautistic individuals, the baby carriage is stored as a group of
nodes (visual fragments) connected by links. These fragments correspond to naturally-occurring
objects such as the sun roof of the baby carriage and the poles. Although the embedded ﬁgure of
the triangle is present in the ﬁnal image, it is not in any of the fragments. Indeed, each side of
the triangle is likely to have strong links to a (different) natural object. To identify the embedded
triangle, a nonautistic individual must thus actively ignore the links leading to these natural frag-
ments. In autistic individuals, on the other hand, the salient object may be stored in the network
either as a single node, or as a tightly-knit cluster of nodes (with relatively few or very weak
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the components in context now serves to limit distractions while searching for the triangle. This
makes the task much easier for autistic individuals.
• Children with autism are better than normal children at visual search tasks, and seem to possess
enhanced discrimination ability. For example, O’Riordan and Plaisted [2001] asked subjects to
perform the following four tasks:
– searching for a red X hidden among green X and red C distractors;
– searching for a red X hidden among pink X and red C distractors;
– searching for a red F hidden among green F and red E distractors;
– searching for a red F hidden among pink F and red E distractors.
Normal children did signiﬁcantly better on the ﬁrst task than the other three, and found the last
task hardest (intuitively, since pink is close to red and E is close to F). Autistic children did better
than normal children on all four tasks. Although they also found the last task the hardest, their
performance did not vary much between the four tasks. O’Riordan and Plaisted did not provide
an explanation for this phenomenon. Again, our model can help here, provided we make some
assumptions about the discrimination process.
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that there is a process that can compare data sequences and
identify shared components based on their similarity. As a special case, such a process should be
able to compare a data sequence with a previously-stored sequence to see if they are essentially
the same. It seems reasonable to assume that this check for sameness is easy if the nodes are
(almost) identical or if they are very different; it is most difﬁcult if they are reasonably similar but
not almost identical. For example, imagine comparing two nodes associated with colors. Since
a particular observation of colors is subject to some variation (depending on lighting conditions,
etc.), as well as some degree of random error in the perceptual process, there is a greater chance
of misclassifying two colors as the same if they are similar than if they are far apart. A simple
approach to dealing with this is to use two thresholds: classify two colors as the same if the
observation indicates that the difference between them is smaller than the lower threshold, classify
them as different if the observation indicates that the difference is larger than the upper threshold,
and repeat the observation (perhaps several times) if the difference is between the two thresholds
to try to get an observation that allows for a more deﬁnite classiﬁcation (for example, by averaging
repeated observations). This two-threshold scheme already explains why, in general, it takes
longer to distinguish red from pink than to distinguish red from green. Pink is likely to fall
between the two thresholds, thus activating repeated observations to minimize errors.
Recall that, according to our model, autistic individuals are likely to store an image like “red F”
using a single node labeled “red F”, while a nonautistic individual is more likely to have two
linked nodes labeled “red” and “F”. Thus, when comparing “red F” to “pink F”, autistic children
just have to compare one pair of nodes, while nonautistic children have to compare two pairs of
nodes (“red” vs. “pink” and “F” vs. “F”). Thus, the amount of time required to make comparisons
will already be signiﬁcantly less than for nonautistic children on all tasks.
Note that this explanation may be applicable to other examples of enhanced perceptual function-
ing in autism (see the review by Mottron et al. [2006]). If a visual image that is represented by
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larger unit in autistic individuals, when queried about this data, autistic children will be able to
respond faster because they will save on integration time and have the data more immediately
accessible. Thus, according to our theory, there is no difference between the search and discrim-
ination algorithms of autistic and nonautistic individuals, nor in their speed of operation. It is
merely the way the data is stored in the network that gives autistic individuals superior perceptual
abilities in some cases. At the same time, this atypical representation can impair the ability of
autistic individuals to ﬁnd context and to extract global meaning.
3.3 Executive Dysfunction
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that one of the core cognitive deﬁcits of autism is executive
dysfunction [Pennington and Ozonoff 1996; Russell 1997]. Since the scope of executive functions is
broad and loosely deﬁned (see [Hill 2004; Ozonoff 1997]), we focus on how our model can explain
only the most central and relatively agreed-upon symptom of executive dysfunction, namely, the fact
that autistic subjects persevere with incorrect responses in tasks that require a cognitive shift, as in the
case of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST).
In this particular test, as described by Ozonoff [1997], subjects are presented with four “key” cards,
which differ in terms of the color, shape, and number of objects depicted on the card. For example, one
card may have ﬁve blue stars; another may have three red circles. Cards in a deck are presented to the
subject one by one, and the subject is asked to choose the key card that best matches the card turned
over. The experimenter has in mind a speciﬁc rule (“match by color”, or “match by number of objects”),
which is not revealed to the subject. However, the examiner does tell the subject whether his choice is
correct (according to the examiner’s rule). Once the subject has made ten correct matches, the rule is
changed, without notice or comment from the examiner. As a result, matches made according to the
earlier rule now receive negative feedback. The primary dependent variable in this test is the number
of trials in which the subject continues sorting according to the previously-correct rule, despite negative
feedback. This number tends to be signiﬁcantly higher for autistic individuals, testifying to their poor
ability to make a cognitive shift [Ozonoff 1997; Pennington and Ozonoff 1996].
To explain this result using our model, we have to explain how an individual’s network affects his
ability to make the required cognitive shift in the WCST. We assume that a nonautistic subject has
learned the concept of a game or test in which sorting cards or objects according to certain rules gave a
verbal or a physical reward. This concept is thus a node in the network, to which are linked clusters of
nodes representing instances of such games that have been played before. In particular, there are links to
games played with cards or building blocks, that in turn are linked to nodes that represent concepts like
colors, shapes, and numbers. (We are making the important assumption here that nonautistic children
have a node representing “color”, with links to speciﬁc instances of colors, and to past experiences in
which objects were grouped based on their color.) The upshot of this is that shared components between
games can be easily accessed. With such a network, a nonautistic subject can both recognize sorting
rules (such as as “sort by color”) easily and more easily manipulate concepts like color and shape to
match the rule(s) used by the experimenter.
In the network of an autistic individual, the situation may be quite different. The atypical distribution
of data is likely to cause particular games or tests to reach ﬁxation in memory before they are split up
into separate components. Note that this does not mean that autistic individuals are not good in deriving
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2003]. We would expect them to be able to quickly derive a speciﬁc rule from a single game that they
have focused on. In this case, an autistic child would have strong and exclusive associations between
the games and its rules.
However, given the differences between the networks of autistic and nonautistic individuals, we
would expect autistic individuals to have more difﬁculty in generating possible rules, even during the
ﬁrst stage of the test. For example, while many different games might involve sorting objects by a
certain feature, such as size or color, the notion of sorting by color might be locked within the context of
sorting blocks, while cards are remembered only as being sorted by suit. Thus, just as with weak central
coherence, the probability of matching the new test context with a particular sorting rule stored in past
memories is lower. The difﬁculty in generating new rules may in part account for why autistic subjects
that manage to ﬁgure out the rule being used by the experimenter have so much difﬁculty in shifting to
a new sorting rule.
There may be additional issues as well. When the examiner changes the sorting rule after ten suc-
cessful trials, the rule previously used suddenly results in negative reinforcement. We would expect
this negative feedback to lead the subject to search for alternative rules in the network. However, the
simple rigid rule of shifting to the closest alternative behavior following the ﬁrst failure is not generally
adaptive (especially if it is the ﬁrst failure after ten successive hits). Occasional failures are common in
many natural foraging tasks and are tolerated at some level without causing a shift in behavior [Kacelnik
and Bateson 1997]. We expect that the mechanism responsible for shifting from one behavioral strategy
to another is based on a more quantitative balance between the expected payoffs of shifting and persist-
ing. Roughly speaking, after “enough” negative feedback, an alternate rule would seem better than the
currently-used rule. But if alternatives are hard to ﬁnd, the greater cost of switching to an alternative
for an autistic child will make them will make the currently-used rule seem better for a longer period
of time. In other words, even if they have a fully functional mechanism for generating cognitive shifts,
autistic subjects are likely to persevere with incorrect responses much longer than nonautistic subjects.
3.4 Other Symptoms
There are several other symptoms of autism that are not obviously consequences of the core deﬁcits
discussed above. Perhaps most notable are a tendency for repetitive behavior and adherence to routines
[Baron-Cohen and Bolton 1993; Tager-Flusberg et al. 2001], and a collection of higher-level deﬁcits
such as a lack of creativity and problems in understanding abstract thinking and humor [Frith 1989;
Howlin 1998]. There have been connections made between humor and difﬁculties with abstract thinking
on the one hand, and the core deﬁcits on the other [Emerich et al. 2003]. We brieﬂy sketch how our
model can explain some of these symptoms.
• Recall that the nature of the fragmented network of autistic individuals makes it easy to follow
links within clusters, but not across clusters. Creativity is often viewed as the ability to make
unexpected connections. To make such connections, it is seems necessary to have many “cross-
cluster” links, which are precisely what autistic individuals lack.
• The ease in following just a few links may also explain some repetitive behavior: the behavior
is repeated because there are no other available links to follow. Our model does not provide a
direct explanation for the more simple repetitive behaviors like hand ﬂapping or head shaking. It
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presence of such behaviors in isolated or abused children [O’Connor and Rutter 2000] as well
as in captive animals [Garner et al. 2003] suggests that some of these behaviors may also be
secondary outcomes of the disorder.
• Without going into the more complex issue of what humor is and why it exists, it is quite clear that
understanding most types of humor depends critically on understanding context and being able to
appreciate certain connections. Humor is often based on things that are either out of context, or ﬁt
into the context in a very unconventional way. Hence, autistic individuals, who have problems in
understanding context, are likely to have difﬁculties in understanding humor. In addition, many
of the more complex humorous situations require the ability to mentalize, which is also impaired
in autism.
• Abstract thinking depends to a great extent on the ability to generalize and to create “is-a” hier-
archies. We have explained in some detail why these abilities are impaired in autistic individuals
and cause problems in developing a theory of mind. These points apply equally well to any type
of abstract thinking. Without the ability to generalize, and to infer that things might exist even
when they are not sensed directly, abstract thinking is impossible.
• Yet another “symptom” commonly associated with autism is that of the autistic savant [Hermelin
2001; Snyder and Mitchell 1999; Snyder et al. 2004]. The ability to remember in detail a long
sequence of music, pictures, text or numbers can be explained to some extent by our model, in
a manner much in the spirit of our explanation above of enhanced perceptual functioning. When
a child hears a new data sequence, he tries to ﬁnd a match to (part of) that data sequence in his
network. If a match is found, the data sequence is found, the sequence is broken up, weights are
changed, and the link structure of the network is modiﬁed. This process typically reduces the
probability that a data sequence will be retrieved exactly in its original form. (Indeed, a teacher
often takes it to be a sign of understanding that a student does not parrot back what was said
earlier as an answer.) An autistic child is far less likely to ﬁnd a match than a normal child,
because his nodes are more likely to be labeled by long data sequences. Thus, if he stores the
new data sequence in his network, he must store it as an entire unit. Of course, to store the data
sequence at all requires that the child be interested in that data sequence. It may well be that most
children are not interested in the effort required to store such long sequences. The reason that
not every autistic child may show “idiot savant” style of abilities is that not all of them may have
the initial interest in acquiring the type of data that allows them to exhibit such abilities. We thus
agree with Mottron et al. [2006] that savant skills may develop through a brain-behavior cycle that
requires a combination of special interests and enhanced perceptual abilities; our model provides
an explanation for why perceptual ability is enhanced in autistic individuals.
• Finally, we remark that the fact that the network of an autistic child may be fragmented and have
more nodes may also help explain some recent neuroanatomical ﬁndings that show that children
with autism have larger brains than do comparison groups [Courchesne et al. 2004; Wallace and
Treffert 2004], and that such brains exhibit local overconnectivity and long-range underconnectiv-
ity[Belmonteetal. 2004; CourchesneandPierce2005]. Someresearchershavesuggestedthatthe
enlarged brain and poor connectivity may be the causes of autism [Belmonte et al. 2004; Cohen
1994; Courchesne and Pierce 2005; Happ´ e 1999]. Our model suggests an alternative explanation
for these ﬁndings that may be equally plausible. The larger brain may be a plastic developmental
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long data sequences without being able to compress them based on similarity. This idea is con-
sistent with the fact that brain size of autistic individuals is normal at birth, and becomes larger
than average only during the ﬁrst few years of life [Aylward et al. 2002; Courchesne et al. 2001;
Courchesne et al. 2004; Wallace and Treffert 2004]. Similarly, according to our model, the local
overconnectivity and long-range underconnectivity may not be the primary causes of autism, but
rather a reﬂection of the fragmented network that develops in autistic individuals as a result of
data acquisition problems.
4 A Computer Simulation
In this section, we describe a simple computer simulation that supports the plausibility of the model
outlined in Section 2.1. In particular, we consider how the fundamental elements of our theory (the
innate template, the data input, and the rate of decay and ﬁxation) might interact dynamically with each
other to produce autistic conditions.
As emphasized repeatedly in the previous sections, one of the primary differences between a typical
and an autistic network—and the one on which we based most of the explanations in Section 3—lies in
the nature of the data units that reach ﬁxation. We suggested that under normal circumstances, due to
coalescing and segmentation, there are relatively few nodes and these are associated with relatively short
data sequences, while under autistic conditions, nodes are typically associated with relatively long data
sequences. We further suggested that the primary cause for these segmentation problems in autism is an
atypical innate network. We simulate here the basic processes of creating labeled nodes as a result of
segmentation, andchangingweightsofthenodes, asdescribedinSection2.1, andusethistotestwhether
having an inappropriate initial network can lead to segmentation problems and their consequences, as
described in Section 2.2. In our simulation, we ignore the process of link formation and “higher-order”
processes like generalization and coalescing, since we want to focus on the number of nodes and the
size of the data sequences associated with each node. As we shall see, there are signiﬁcant qualitative
differences between “normal” conditions and “autistic” conditions along these dimensions.
The simulation is quite naive, and is perhaps best viewed as a proof of concept, rather than a serious
test of the theory. Nevertheless, we believe that even this simple simulation gives some insight into the
model and provides some support for our claims.
4.1 Data Acquisition
In our simulation, the only data that can be acquired are the following 25 sequences of three letters:
abc aei mki ahc dbf
def dhl jhf dkf gei
ghi gko gec gni jhl
jkl jnc dbo jel mko
mno mbf anl mho ani
Table 1: The 25 data sequences used.
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represent the sentence “Jon-drinks-milk” (or the visual scene of “Jon”, “a human hand holding an ob-
ject”, and “a glass of milk”), and the sequence “ahc” might represent a sentence like “Jon-spills-milk”.
To keep things simple and tractable, we considered only three-letter data sequences. The simulation
could easily be extended to data sequences of variable length; we do not expect the results to be quali-
tatively different. The size of the simulation data set is obviously small in comparison to any real data
set but, again, we do not expect a larger set to lead to qualitative differences. However, clearly much
more work is needed to check that the basic principles in our model scale up to deal with larger and
more realistic settings, where the data is much richer than simple strings of characters, and has a richer
semantic structure.
The simulation uses two parameters:
• γ—this is used as both the initial weight of a new node added to the network and the amount
that the weight of a node is increased when the data sequence labeling that node is observed.
(Intuitively, a node has weight 0 initially, so the initial weight can be viewed as the increase from
a weight in 0 when a data sequence is ﬁrst observed.)
• δ—this is the amount that the weight of a node decreases at a given step if the node is not rein-
forced. This parameter corresponds to the decay rate in our earlier discussion.
We run the simulation with different values of γ and δ, to see the effect of these parameters on the
outcome.
In Section 2.1 we were deliberately vague as to exactly how data sequences were segmented. For
our computer simulation, we have to make some further assumptions. Roughly speaking, we assume
that a new data sequence s is segmented if (a) another sequence s0 is encountered such that s and s0
have a common subsequence s00, and (b) the weight of either s0 or s00 is greater than some minimal
threshold that we call the breaking threshold. We take the ﬁxation threshold to be 1; a node’s label is not
segmented further once the node’s weight reaches 1. Using the breaking threshold ensures that a new
sequence must be observed a number of times before it affects the network structure. We considered
breaking thresholds of both 0 and 0.5. A threshold of 0 amounts to running the threshold without a
breaking threshold. We believe that, in practice, there is likely to be a positive breaking threshold, both
to minimize errors and to avoid the processing of unimportant data. We present the algorithm and report
the results for breaking threshold 0.5 here; the results for 0 are qualitatively similar, and are available
upon request.
In more detail, we proceed as follows. We assume that at each step in the simulation, the “network”
consists of a set of nodes, each of which has an associated weight and is labeled by some data sequence,
but no links. (We put “network” in quotes here because there are in fact no links.) Each data sequence
is the label of at most one node. Some of the nodes are “active”; the rest are “passive”. Passive nodes
do not have weights. They can be thought of as dummy nodes, which serve as a technical device
for representing data sequences that had weight above the breaking threshold but were broken up into
subsequences. There are no passive nodes in the model discussed in Section 2.1; their role is played
by links. For example, if “abc” is broken up into “a”, “b”, and “c”, we would expect there to be links
with high weight between “a” and “b” and between “b” and “c” (and perhaps also between “a” and “c”).
Thus, even if there is no node labeled “abc” in the network, the links provide a way of representing the
fact that there was once a node labeled “abc” in the network, and that its subsequences are still in the
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this relationship instead of using a link. Given this intuition, for every passive node in the network,
there must be some active nodes labeled with subsequences of the passive node’s label. The practical
importance of passive nodes in our simulation is that if a sequence such as “abc” has already been seen
and segmented before, a newly observed “abc” does not need to wait again until it reaches the breaking
threshold before being segmented (see step 4 below, as opposed to step 3).
At each step of the simulation, a single data sequence (e.g. “abc” or “def”) is selected at random
from those given in Table 1. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that all data sequences are equally likely
to be observed. (We later consider more skewed distributions.) However, some data sequences may be
“ignored”, in the sense that they do not affect segmentation or the weights of nodes. The likelihood of a
data sequence being ignored depends on the nodes already in the network.
In the algorithm, we use the phrases partial match and exact match. A data sequence x partially
matches another data sequence y if y is a subsequence of x; x is an exact match of y if x = y. Thus,
“abc” partially matches all of “a”, “b”, “c”, “ab”, or “bc”; “abc” is an exact match only to “abc”.
1. If the new data sequence does not match (exactly or partially) the label of any active node in the
network, then a new node is added with probability 0.005, labeled with the new data sequence.
The new node gets weight γ. Note that we allow new data to be acquired even if it has no partial
match in the network, but at a very low probability. Thus, if the data sequence selected is “abc”,
and “abc” does not (partially) match any node already in the network, then with probability 0.995,
it is ignored altogether, and with probability 0.005, a new node is added to the network labeled
“abc” and is assigned weight γ. There is evidence that even autistic individuals may acquire some
data by chance, for example, if it is heard or observed at a time of another stimulating event [Frith
1989, p. 125]. More generally, mechanisms of temporal association known from associative
learning (e.g. [Pearce and Bouton 2001]) may facilitate the sporadic acquisition of data that does
not match data already in the network.
2. If the new data sequence exactly matches the label of an active node already in the network, then
the weight of that node increases by γ. If, as a result, this weight is greater than or equal to the
0.5 breaking threshold, go to instruction 5; otherwise, go to instruction 6.
3. If the new data sequence does not exactly match the label of either a passive or active node, but
it does partially match the label of an active node in the network, add a new node to the network
with weight γ, labeled with the new data sequence. (Note that we do not have to check if the new
data sequence partially matches a passive node, because if it does, it must also partially match an
active node in the network.) Go to instruction 6.
4. If the new data item exactly matches the label of a passive node already in the network (which
means that this item has been acquired before), search the network for active nodes with weight
greater than or equal to the 0.5 breaking threshold labeled by data sequences that either are sub-
sequences of the new data sequence or overlap with the new sequence. To see what happens then,
suppose that the new data sequence is “abc”, there is a passive node labeled “abc”, and the only
active nodes with weight above threshold labeled by partial matches to “abc” have labels “c” and
“aei”, with weights 1.4 and 0.6, respectively. One of these two nodes is chosen, with a probabil-
ity according to their relative weights;12 that is, the node labeled “c” is chosen with probability
12In the simulation, for convenience, we use relative weights to choose among alternative segmentation possibilities. We do
341.4/(1.4 + 0.6) = 0.7; similarly, the node labeled “aei” is chosen with probability 0.3. If the
node labeled “c” is chosen, then “abc” is broken up into “ab”, and “c”. The weight of the nodes
labeled “ab” and “c” are both increased by γ. (If there is no node labeled “ab”, then one is added
to the network with initial weight γ.) Similarly, if “aei” is chosen, then the sequences are broken
up into “a”, “ei”, and “bc”. The new weight of “a” is the sum of its old weight (0 if there was no
node labeled “a”, but note that there may be a node labeled “a” in the network with weight below
threshold), 0.9 (the old weight of “aei”), and γ (representing the support of the observation “abc”
for “a”). The new weight of “ei” is the sum of its old weight and 0.9; the weight of “bc” is the
sum of its old weight and γ. Finally, “aei” becomes a passive node. It is important here that “aei”
must have weight between 0.5 and 1. If its weight is greater than one, it has become ﬁxated, and
then cannot be broken up into subsequences. A sequence such as “ei” that has become ﬁxated can
be used to break up larger sequences, but cannot be broken up itself.
5. The network is searched for further pairs of data sequences that can be segmented, using the
rules of instruction 4. For example, if the weight of the node labeled “abc” reached the breaking
threshold as a result of applying instruction 2, then “abc” can be segmented if a node labeled
“aei” is already in the network and has weight above the breaking threshold. Similarly, if a node
labeled “ei” reached the breaking threshold as a result of applying instruction 4 and there is a
node in the network labeled “gei” with weight above the breaking threshold but not ﬁxated, then
it is segmented into “g” and “ei”. This instruction is repeated until no further sequences can be
segmented.
6. All nodes with weight < 1 (i.e., below the ﬁxation threshold) that were not observed (i.e., whose
weight did not increase as a result of applying instructions 1–5) have their weight decreased by
δ. Moreover, if there is a passive node such that all the subsequences of its label are labels of
nodes with weight 0, then the passive node disappears from the network. For example, if there is
a passive node labeled “abc”, and every node with label “a”, “b”, “c”, “ab”, or “bc” has weight 0,
then the node labeled “abc” disappears from the network.13
The algorithm summarized by the ﬂowchart in Figure 3.
To compare the “normal” case to the “autistic” case, we run the simulation with different initial
networks. For the normal case, we started with two nodes, labeled “a” and “f” respectively, both with
initial weight 1. For the autistic case, we started with two nodes, labeled “abc” and “def”, again both
with initial weight 1. We can think of these nodes as initial templates, in the sense of the discussion in
Section 2.3. Alternatively, they may result from skewed input data distributions early in life. According
to this latter possibility, these initial nodes may not represent the innate templates themselves, but rather
the effect of the templates on the initial data. For example, we would expect a newborn to have an initial
template that results in her focusing on her mother’s face and voice and the words her mother utters. If
an autistic child’s initial template is different, the distribution of words that the autistic child focuses on
will be different from that of a normal child, resulting in early networks that are already quite different.
not mean to suggest that this is actually how people choose among segmentation possibilities in practice. As we mentioned
earlier in the paper, we believe that, in a real network, such decisions are often based on context.
13Given our very small rate of decrease and the fact that we choose data sequences at random, it is very unlikely that nodes
that at one point have weight above threshold will have their weight go down to 0. Thus, passive nodes essentially never
disappear from the network. However, we can imagine that if the distribution of data sequences changes over time, so some
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match the new sequence. Then, start 
the breaking cascade as detailed in 
instruction 4 in the text. 
5. Search for further pairs of nodes with weight ≥ 0.5 that can be 
segmented, and repeat the process until no further sequences can 
be segmented.  
START:
6. All nodes whose weight did not increase in steps 1-5 whose  
weight < 1 (the fixation threshold) have their weight decreased 
by δ.   If, as a result, a passive node no longer partially matches 
an active node in the network with weight above 0, delete this 
passive node from the network. 
Figure 2: A ﬂowchart describing the algorithm.
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Figure 3: A ﬂowchart describing the algorithm.
36For example, an autistic child may ignore almost all words other than the one or two that are uttered in
the context of her unusual focus of interest.
We can illustrate this point, and at the same time show that the differences between the normal case
and the autistic case are really due to differences in the distribution, by considering a modiﬁed version
of the simulation where the only difference between the normal case and the autistic case is the input
distribution. Speciﬁcally, we start the same simulation with an empty network (so that there are no
initial templates, and all strings have initial probability 0.005 of being acquired in step 1) and consider
two input distributions. One is the uniform distribution; the second makes “abc” and “def” 15 times
more likely to be chosen than other strings. With the uniform distribution, if we run the simulation
sufﬁciently long (1000 steps sufﬁces), we get normal segmentation. On the other hand, with the skewed
distribution, after 500–1000 steps, the ﬁrst ﬁxed elements are “abc” and “def”, and we are essentially
back to the case of having “abc” and “def” as the initial template. (This result is robust for all values of
γ and δ that we used in our simulation.) This shows that we can simulate the two initial networks that
we used by starting with an empty network and taking the initial distribution over data sequences to be
either uniform or appropriately skewed.
Of course, we do not need to assume a uniform distribution to get good segmentation. Many other
choices will work as well, as long as the initial distribution is not too skewed. For example, an initial
distribution that puts an initial weight of 0.495 on “abc” and “def”, and splits the remaining 0.01 on the
remaining strings, is unlikely to produce good segmentation. Moreover, there is nothing special about
this case. It is easy to show analytically that we can simulate the effects of any initial template consisting
of nonoverlapping strings by an appropriately skewed distribution.
4.2 Results and Discussion
The results of our simulation for breaking threshold 0.5 are summarized in Figure 4. Recall that there
are two parameters in our experiments: the increase γ in the weight of a node when the data matches the
label of the node and the amount δ of decay when there is no match. We consider ﬁve possible values
of γ: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, or 0.5, and ﬁve possible values of δ: 0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, or 0.02. We took all
possible combinations of these two parameters, giving 25 settings. For each setting of the parameters,
we considered runs of ﬁve possible lengths: 100, 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 steps. (The length of
a run is the number of times we repeat instructions 1–6 of the algorithm above.) For each of the 25
possible (γ,δ) settings and each of the 5 run lengths, we ran the experiment 10 times. We considered
the size of ﬁxated sequences at the end of the experiment, averaged over the ten runs where the same
setting and the same run length were used, and the number of ﬁxated data sequences, again averaged
over the ten runs.
The top graph on the left of Figure 4 considers the average length of ﬁxated units (that is, units with
weight ≥ 1) for all 25 (γ,δ) settings when the runs have length 100. The pink squares show the situation
for the autistic setting; the blue diamonds show the situation for the normal setting. Each pink square
and each blue diamond represents an average of ten runs. Note that, for all the parameter settings, in
the autistic case, the ﬁxed units had a length of three. On the other hand, in the normal case, most data
sequences are broken up, and the average length of the ﬁxated data sequences is somewhere between 1
and 1.4, depending on the (γ,δ) setting.
The top graph on the right considers how many data sequences become ﬁxated when runs have
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Figure 4: Experimental results.
38sequences that become ﬁxated are the two original data sequences, which started out ﬁxated. On the
other hand, as γ gets larger relative to δ, in the normal case, almost all 15 of the data of length 1 get
ﬁxated, and perhaps a few of length 2. On the other hand, in the autistic case, no more data sequences
get ﬁxated during the ﬁrst 100 steps.
In the normal case, as runs get longer, almost all data sequences that get ﬁxated continue to have
length 1, and there are more parameter settings for which almost all sequences of length 1 get ﬁxated.
The only problematic cases are when γ = 0.1 (the smallest possible setting) and δ ≥ 0.01. We expect
that such combinations, where learning is not successful, are unlikely to survive in nature; natural
selection will weed them out. To understand why sequences are broken up so efﬁciently, note that,
because the normal case starts with nodes labeled “a” and “f” that are already ﬁxated, if a new data
sequence is observed that includes an “a” or an “f” and that data sequence does not already appear
in the network, then a new node is added to the network labeled by that data sequence, according to
instruction 3 of the algorithm. As long as the ratio of γ to δ is not too small, the weight of that node
will increase according to instruction 2 until it reaches threshold. At that point, by instruction 5, it will
be broken up. This process very quickly breaks up all data sequences to sequences of length 1. In other
words, “a” and “f” serve as “attractors”, attracting all new data sequences that include an “a” or an “f”
into the network, and breaking them into smaller units, which in turn, attract additional sequences that
include these newly broken units (e.g., a broken “ani” previously attracted by “a” can now attract “gni”
due to a newly broken “ni”). By way of contrast, “abc” is a bad attractor, since it can only attract other
“abc”s.
The autistic case exhibits markedly different behavior. What happens is quite sensitive to the setting
of γ and δ. Nevertheless, in almost all cases, the average size of ﬁxated data sequences is above 2. The
average number varies considerably. To understand why, consider what is involved in breaking up a
subsequence. Note that the “abc” and “def” initially in the network in the autistic case cannot be used
to break up anything, since they are already ﬁxated. If an “abc” or “def” is observed, the weight of
these nodes increases. On the other hand, if, say, “ahc” is observed, it gets added to the network with
probability only 0.005. Thus, in runs of length 100, it is extremely unlikely that any new node gets
added, let alone that it is ﬁxated. For a sequence to be broken up into subsequences, two sequences
must be added, and the second one to reach threshold must do so before the ﬁrst gets ﬁxated. This is
a rather unlikely event. If runs are sufﬁciently long, this does happen occasionally, which is why the
number of ﬁxed units can be signiﬁcant in runs of length 1,000 or more, especially if the ratio γ/δ is
high. In runs of length 10,000 where the ratio is greater than 30, we often ﬁnd that many sequences are
ﬁxated, but they are long sequences (of which there are many more than the 15 sequences of length 1).
Thus, we get a situation where there are more ﬁxated sequences in the autistic case than in the normal
case. This is consistent with the possible need for an “enlarged brain” in autistic children, mentioned at
the end of Section 3.
To summarize, the computer simulation was able to capture many of the behaviors predicted by our
model. As a result of having only a different initial template, in the autistic case, data acquisition was
slow, segmentation did not work properly, and the nodes that were ﬁxated were typically labeled by
long data sequences. Moreover, learning based on the abnormal initial template was very sensitive to
the settings of γ and δ. Roughly speaking, the reason for this is that nodes labeled with longer sequences
can attract fewer data sequences (“aei”, for example, can attract only “aei”, while “ei” can attract “aei”
and “gei”, and “a” can attract all the ﬁve sequences in Table 1 that include an “a”). Attracting more
sequences results in more segmentation, which in turn attracts more sequences. If fewer sequences are
39attracted, the ones in the network are more likely to decay before reaching ﬁxation. As we can see
in Figure 4, learning based on the abnormal initial template was indeed successful only when γ was
relatively high and δ relatively low.
This observation may provide an additional important insight into the developmental process of
autism. Autistic individuals are known to exhibit marked contrasts of performance in different cognitive
tasks (see, e.g., [Baron-Cohen and Bolton 1993; Happ´ e 1999]). One way to explain this phenomenon,
as we pointed out earlier, is in terms of inappropriate initial templates, which cause autistic individu-
als to acquire a great deal of data in some domains but very little or no data in other domains. The
simulation results presented here suggest an additional explanation. The great sensitivity to the weight
increase/decrease ratio shown by our simulation means that natural ﬂuctuations in this ratio that are un-
likely to affect normal children can be critical for autistic children. It is well known that the strength of
memorizing or forgetting events or scenes (represented by the increase and decrease rate, respectively, in
our simulation) is not uniform, and likely to be affected by the context or the strength of reinforcement
[Domjan 1998] and its importance for survival value [Nairne et al. 2007]. In other words, the different
increase/decrease ratios considered by our simulation may all be represented in a single individual but
for different types of data. Our simulation shows that the “autistic template” response to this variation
is to produce peaks and valleys in learning performance, similar to those observed in autistic children.
We believe that we could have generated similar behavior by using different breaking thresholds for
the autistic and normal case rather than by using different initial networks. For example, if we took the
breaking threshold in the autistic case to be 0.9 instead of 0.5 (but kept it at 0.5 for the normal case), then
the small window until ﬁxation in the autistic case would guarantee that very few sequences would be
broken up. (We could achieve the same effect by keeping the breaking threshold at 0.5 and lowering the
ﬁxation threshold to 0.6.) In any case, we feel that having a smaller window is less consistent with the
primary symptoms of autism, such as problems with joint attention and social orientation. Furthermore,
a smaller window is likely to lead to a systematic failure of learning in all domains. This contradicts
the observation that autistic individuals are often able to learn quite well in some domains [Happ´ e 1999;
Snyder and Mitchell 1999]. We therefore ﬁnd it unlikely that autism emerges simply as a result of such
a “narrow window”.
Finally, we note that our simulation assumed a particular segmentation process. While we have not
considered other segmentation mechanisms in detail, we believe that all current approach to segmenta-
tion will lead to qualitatively similar results. This is because they do segmentation based on cues that
depend on the relative distribution of data units, in particular, the co-occurrence of data units. If a string
like “abc” is very common, while none of its components are, all approaches will fail to segment it. (See
[Brent 1999] for an overview of current approaches to segmentation.)
5 Conclusions
We have presented a data-driven conceptual model for learning. We have deliberately left many of
the details of the model unspeciﬁed; they will clearly need to be ﬂeshed out. It may well be the case
that some of the speciﬁc mechanisms we have suggested are not quite right. Moreover, there are many
important representation issues that our naive model does not address, including the representation
of goals and hypothesis testing. While we believe that our model could be extended to handle such
more sophisticated issues, doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. Despite the shortcomings of the
model, we believe that it is a useful tool for explaining autism. In particular, we have shown how an
40inappropriate distribution of data can result in all the major observations associated with autism. In
addition, we have shown how we can use the model itself to explain the inappropriate distribution as
the result of an inappropriate initial (or early) network. We believe that the consistency between the
symptoms of autism and the data-acquisition disorder predicted by our model suggests that the model
itself is correct.
An obvious question at this point is whether our model makes any testable predictions. In fact
it does. We consider two predictions here. The most straightforward prediction is that the data-input
distribution of a young child can be manipulated in such a way as to lead to autistic behaviors. Of course,
this obvious test is unethical (and technically difﬁcult to carry out in any case, since it is hard to force
people to pay attention to only certain things).14 Alternatively, it may be possible to ethically test the
effect of more modest “small scale” manipulations. For example, in some studies on word segmentation,
sequences of an artiﬁcial language were broadcast to human infants (e.g., [Aslin et al. 1998; Gomez
2002; Saffran et al. 1996]). Similar methods may be used to test how different data distributions
affect segmentation. Perhaps these experiments could then be extended to study how different data
distributions affect a child’s representation and ability to predict. (In our model, this amounts to studying
how different data distributions affect the construction of the network representation.)
A second prediction made by our model is with regard to the effectiveness of early-intervention
methods. While there is currently no medical treatment for autism, it has become increasingly clear that
early behavioral intervention is highly beneﬁcial for autistic children [Green 1996; Jensen and Sinclair
2002; Rogers 1998; Volkmar and Pauls 2003]. Indeed, some experts argue that intensive behavioral
intervention can even result in a complete recovery from autism [Lovaas 1987; McEachin et al. 1993].
So far, there has been no theory that explains how a behavioral treatment can possibly cure autism,
nor why these treatments are successful in some cases but not in others [Bibby et al. 2001; Lovaas
1987]. Theclaimsofpossiblecuresremaincontroversial, andmanyexpertsviewbehavioralintervention
as only one way to facilitate compensatory learning (see, e.g., [Frith 2001], [Howlin 1998, pp. 77-
81]). Our model predicts that any treatment that helps autistic children to get a more typical ﬂow of
data will reduce the severity of the disorder. Moreover, we can test whether more of a focus on the
data distribution can produce signiﬁcant improvement. Despite differences among early-intervention
methods, all of them can be viewed as attempting to ﬁnding ways to provide the child with more data,
according to a more typical distribution. (Although the treatment methods typically do not speak in
terms of data—they speak in terms of “experiences”, “communication cycles”, “games”, “learning”,
“operant conditioning”, and so on—in terms of our model, what they do can be viewed as pushing
data.) For example, some behavioral treatments start by using reinforcement to teach a child to create
eye contact [Lovaas 1981]. The aim of this approach is to artiﬁcially cause autistic children to gain
interest in what should have interested them in the ﬁrst place. If this is successful, the child should
start acquiring a more typical data ﬂow, and may recover from the initial problem. (See also Koegel et
al. [2001] for related evidence on pivotal areas in intervention for autism.)
14There is anecdotal evidence supporting this prediction, showing that severe social deprivation early in life may result
in some features that resemble autism (e.g. [O’Connor and Rutter 2000]). The data distribution for these socially deprived
childrenisunlikelytohavethesecondpropertythatwediscussedinSection2.2(thatcertainphrasesareencounteredfrequently
but their constituents are not encountered in other contexts), which is why we would not expect them to exhibit exactly the
same behavior that we see in autistic children. There is also evidence that socially deprived children make considerable
progress after being treated and integrated into society (see Frith’s [1989] discussion of the “Kaspar Hauser” case). This
too is consistent with our theory; if we assume that their initial network is normal, once they encounter a more normal data
distribution, things improve.
41On the other hand, our model also suggests why recovery may not be achieved in all cases and,
implicitly, why performing a deﬁnitive experiment may be difﬁcult. With some severely autistic children
it may not be possible to repair the initial network so as to get a more appropriate data ﬂow. And even if
the repair process is initially successful, it may not be sufﬁciently fast and comprehensive to prevent the
atypical ﬁxation of long data sequences in the network. In such cases, a child may exhibit substantial
gains, but still exhibit some symptoms of autism, even in adulthood. Finally, it is possible that early
intervention may not work for a type of autism for which the main problem in data acquisition is not
related to the innate network, but rather to a problem in the mechanism that adjusts the weights or the
reward value of data sequences.
Nevertheless, by highlighting the critical window between decay and ﬁxation, our model may sug-
gest possible improvements in early-intervention programs. Because issues of timing and the quantity
of data are critical for dealing with decay and ﬁxation, the task of restoring an appropriate data ﬂow
in early-intervention programs is not simple. Intensive treatment alone may not guarantee the right
quantitative balance for obtaining the best results. We suggest that special attention be given to the
frequency and the distribution of data sequences provided in early-intervention programs. While the
exact solutions need to be studied experimentally with intervention experts, the main principle may be
quite simple. Considering the time window between decay and ﬁxation, a child needs to receive data
sequences that have sufﬁcient commonalities that they can be broken into natural subsequences. This
should help in enabling an autistic child to build a meaningful network.
The biological causes of autism are complex [Eigsti and Shapiro 2003], and although prevention
of autism through prenatal genetic screening would be the ideal solution, there is no sign that this will
be feasible in the very near future. For the time being, behavioral programs will continue to be the
main treatment for autism [Volkmar and Pauls 2003]. We hope that our model can help in improving
such programs by providing a theoretical framework in which the effect of quantitative issues like data
distribution, decay, and ﬁxation can be tested experimentally. More importantly, if our model is correct,
it means that, at least in principle, autism is curable. Even if the model is correct though, it is clear that
much further work needs to be done to elucidate the details. We hope that our results have provided
some motivation for further research along these lines.
Our model also suggests other lines of research. For one thing, we have stressed the importance of
the initial network. The form of the initial network presumably has a biological basis. Perhaps different
areas in the brain contain, or are linked to, parts of the original innate network. The innate nodes attract
new data sequences and store them in their close vicinity, or in other easily linked areas. Accordingly,
a certain area of the brain may become specialized in, for example, face processing, because it is the
default storage area for data associated with the nodes that form the template for human faces. There
may be other areas in the brain that are responsible for tuning the reinforcement value of data sequences
(i.e., the weights of the nodes associated with them), rather than storing them. (It has been suggested
that the amygdala serves such a function [Grelotti et al. 2002].) If this model is correct, then a major
challenge for future research would be to try to understand better the initial structure of the network and
its relation to brain structure. This would then lead to a better understanding of how problems in the
initial structure lead to autism.
It would also be of interest to investigate whether brain neuroanatomical abnormalities in autistic
individuals are a secondary outcome of developing an atypical network as a result of having an abnormal
initial template. For example, we suggested at the end of Section 3 that evidence for the enlarged
brain sometimes associated with autism may be explained by the presence of many nodes labeled by
42long data sequences in an autistic child’s network, and that the local overconnectivity and long-range
underconnectivity exhibited by the brains of autistic children may also be a consequence of the poor
connectivity predicted by our model. Another example comes from a recent study about the lack of the
fusiform face area in the cortex of autistic individuals [Grelotti et al. 2002]. Interestingly, Grelotti et
al. suggest that the problem is not that a postulated module for face processing is impaired in autistic
individuals, but rather that autistic individuals fail to develop cortical face specialization as a result of
their initial reduced interest in human faces.
The possible implications of such innate nodes may go well beyond autism. As we suggested in
Section 2.3, variations in cognitive style and talents may be due to slight variations in the structure of
the innate initial network. Faced with the same environment, individuals with slightly different initial
network may end up having quite different networks in later life. For example, one may be highly
interested in visual scenes and will therefore have an extensive network of visual nodes. This, in turn,
helps him in storing and using further new data associated with this already rich and useful visual
context. Another individual may be initially more interested in sounds and verbal utterances and may
develop a relatively richer network of nodes that store verbal information, sounds, or even music. We
speculate that much of the variation in what we perceive as intelligence does not reﬂect variation in
basic processing speed, or memory capacity, but rather variations in the structure of the network. Some
networks may be better at supporting cognitive skills that we perceive as “intelligent” or “high level”,
while others may support skills that are no less impressive from a computational point of view, but may
be related to more basic motor or visual skills.
We conclude with one ﬁnal potential line of research: We have viewed autism as the result of one
particular set of problems with a child’s network. But clearly these are not the only kinds of problems
that can occur in network formation; other diseases may be the result of a different set of problems. In
particular, we are hoping to investigate the extent to which schizophrenia may be the result of having a
network that is “too connected”.15
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